CAT/C/68/D/782/2016 effective nature of an application for revocation, 18 the Committee is unable to conclude that the fact that the complainant did not submit an application for revocation prevented him from submitting his complaint to the Committee. In the circumstances of the present case, the Committee finds that article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention does not preclude it from declaring the communication admissible. 9.6 The Committee also notes that the State party has challenged the admissibility of the complaint on the grounds of insufficient substantiation, since the complainant alleges that the extradition request by Egypt is of a political nature, in view of the complainant’s criticism of the regime as a journalist. The State party submits that the complainant was able to challenge the arrest warrant before the Court of Cassation, as an extradition court, which rejected his claims; that the complainant had not made the judicial authorities aware of the risk he faced of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment if extradited; and that the Moroccan authorities had not identified any risk of torture in the event of extradition. The Committee notes the complainant’s claim that, contrary to the assertions of the State party, he and his lawyer made the Crown Prosecutor and the Court of Cassation aware of the complainant’s personal, real and serious risk of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment for his opinions as a journalist if he were to be extradited. The Committee notes that the complainant fears for his physical security and is afraid that he would have to serve the life sentence handed down against him in 2013, bearing in mind the current climate of widespread repression in Egypt. Moreover, the Committee notes that the complainant has allegedly been detained in the high-security wing of Tiflet 2 prison in solitary confinement, without medical assistance, which is likely to negatively affect his health, and without any contact with his family or his lawyer, in contravention of article 16 of the Convention. The Committee therefore finds that the complainant has sufficiently substantiated his complaint for the purposes of admissibility. 9.7 The Committee finds that the communication is admissible under article 22 of the Convention with respect to the alleged violation of article 3 and article 16, and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 10.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 10.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the extradition of the complainant to Egypt would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The Committee recalls that the prohibition of torture is absolute and non-derogable and that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked by a State party to justify acts of torture. 19 The principle of “non-refoulement” of persons to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture, set out in article 3 of the Convention, is similarly absolute. 20 10.3 In assessing whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the alleged victim would be in danger of being subjected to torture, the Committee recalls that, under article 3 (2) of the Convention, States parties must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the country to which he or she would be returned. In the present case, the Committee must determine whether the complainant runs a personal risk of being subjected to torture if he is extradited to Egypt. The existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture if extradited to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. 21 Conversely, the 18 19 20 21 GE.19-22535 R.A.Y. v. Morocco, para. 6.3. General comment No. 2 (2007) on the implementation of article 2 by States parties, para. 5. General comment No. 4, para. 9. Alhaj Ali v. Morocco (CAT/C/58/D/682/2015), para. 8.3; R.A.Y. v. Morocco, para. 7.2; and L.M. v. Canada (CAT/C/63/D/488/2012), para. 11.3. 9