York.687 Furthermore, some of the offences that detainees have been charged with, as discussed in more detail below, are not confined to alleged violations of the laws of war. For instance, despite being the most common charge against detainees, the offence of providing material support for terrorism is not a violation of the laws of war.688 Providing material support to terrorist groups and acts, however, are federal offences that can be charged in federal courts.689 The above suggests that federal courts may in fact be a more appropriate venue for trying detainees. 307. Second, and despite President Obama’s reliance on the fact that military commissions enable the “protection of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence gathering”, it is equally true that federal courts consistently handle cases involving classified and sensitive information. For instance, Guantánamo detainees’ habeas corpus cases in federal courts routinely involve such information.690 In federal prosecutions of suspected terrorists, including the federal trial of former Guantánamo detainee Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, federal courts have issued protective orders to help prevent the disclosure of both “particularly sensitive discovery materials” and classified information.691 Furthermore, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) is used by federal courts to protect classified evidence in a way that balances the defendant’s rights with the US government’s national security needs.692 The military commissions’ Chief Prosecutor, Brigadier General Mark Martins, has stated that CIPA serves as the basis for the military commissions statute and rules and that the rules “incorporate CIPA and codify federal case law regarding CIPA 687 United States District Court Southern District of New York, United States v. Usama Bin Laden et al., “Indictment”, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802160/indict.pdf>; United States District Court Southern District of New York, United States v. Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Ali al Badwi and Fahd al Quso, “Indictment”, <http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/cole/usalbadawi051503ind.pdf>. See, also, Oriana Zill, “The U.S. Embassy Bombings Trial – A Summary”, Frontline, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/bombings.html>; UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Report to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, op. cit., note 22, para. 21. 688 See, for instance, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, al Bahlul v. United States of America, (en banc), 14 July 2014, op. cit., note 680: “The Government concedes that material support is not an international law-of-war offense (…) and we so held in Hamdan II”, “The government has repeatedly conceded that the three offenses of which Bahlul was convicted [namely material support for terrorism, solicitation and conspiracy] are not, and were not at the time of Bahlul’s conduct, law-of-war offenses under international law”. See, also, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, al Bahlul v. United States of America, 12 June 2015, op. cit., note 632: “In light of the international community’s explicit and repeated rejection of conspiracy as a law of war offense”. 689 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B, 2339C. See, also, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Report to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, op. cit., note 22, para. 21: “the Government’s justification for military commissions is incorrect as a matter of fact because the nexus between the events of 11 September and United States citizens would allow ordinary courts to try offences such as conspiracy and terrorism”. ODIHR notes that before October 2001, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which authorizes federal courts to prosecute individuals for providing material support to terrorists, may not have applied to conduct committed outside the United States. Nonetheless, if the punishable conduct did constitute a war crime, ordinary courtsmartial would have presumably been available. 690 See, for example, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Boumediene v. Bush, 20 November 2008, op. cit., note 203, pp. 9-10: “[t]o support its claim (…) the Government relies exclusively on information contained in a classified document from an unnamed source.(…) Unfortunately, due to the classified nature of the Government’s evidence, I cannot be more specific about the deficiencies of the Government’s case at this time”; United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Dhiab v. Obama, Case No. 05-1457, 3 October 2014, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/103-2014-Dhiab-order.pdf>: In Dhiab v. Obama, there has been extensive litigation around the public release of the redacted video footage of Dhiab being forcibly extracted of his cell and force-fed. Both the government and Dhiab’s lawyers are to privately review the tapes prior to their public disclosure. The tapes have not been released publically at the time of this report. 691 “National Security Prosecutions: Protective Orders”, Federal Judicial Center, February 2013, pp. 46-72, <http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/trpord02.pdf/$file/trpord02.pdf>. 692 “Synopsis of Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)”, United States Department of Justice website, <http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02054.htm>. 133