made until the end of 2012.909 In light of the length between the charges and the final decisions on appeal (as noted, al Bahlul’s case has not yet reached this stage), ODIHR’s view is that the right to be tried without undue delay has likely been violated in both cases.910 377. Other delays may be partly explained by the complexity of the case. Charges were sworn against the five co-defendants in the Mohammad et al. case in April 2008.911 These charges were subsequently withdrawn in January 2010 after the Obama administration decided to try the defendants in federal court.912 Following the subsequent decision to try the 9/11 suspects by a military commission, charges were again sworn in May 2011.913 At the time of this report, the Mohammad et al. case remained at the pre-trial stage. 378. ODIHR notes that this case is very complex. It involves five defendants who are charged with eight serious offences in relation to the death of thousands of people on 9/11. This case likely involves a large quantity of evidence, including classified evidence, and witnesses, as well as complicated legal, factual, evidential and procedural issues. This complexity necessarily entails a trial of considerable duration, particularly to allow both the prosecution and the defence sufficient time to prepare. 379. Nevertheless, acts of the US government have contributed to the slow pace of this trial. First, the US government decided to try the five co-defendants together in a court without long-standing established rules of procedure or precedent. Second, it dropped all charges in order to try the co-defendants in federal court only to later decide to use the military commissions. This by itself led to a delay of almost one and a half years. Third, the decision by the US government to hold trials at Guantánamo creates challenges to attorneyclient meetings and to holding regularly scheduled hearings as the judges and lawyers live in the United States and must travel to Guantánamo.914 Fourth, further delays occurred after FBI agents secretly questioned members of al Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammad’s defence teams thereby creating concerns over potential conflicts of interest between the defence teams and their clients.915 Although the FBI’s actions were revealed in April 2014, 909 United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Hamdan v. United States of America, “On Petition for Review from the United States Court of Military Commission Review”, 16 October 2012, op. cit., note 630. 910 The Human Rights Committee has, for example, found violations where there was a delay of two and a half years and over three years between the conviction and the final decision on appeal. UN HRC, Jose Luis Garcia Fuenzalida v. Ecuador, Communication No. 480/1991, 12 July 1996, para. 9.6, <http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f57%2fD%2f480%2f1991&L ang=en>; UN HRC, Eustace Henry and Everald Douglas v. Jamaica, Communication No. 571/1994, 25 July 1996, para. 9.4, <http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f57%2fD%2f571%2f1994&L ang=en>. 911 See, for instance, United States Military Commission, “Charge Sheet: Khalid Shaikh Mohammad”, 9 May 2008. 912 See, for instance: United States Military Commission, “Direction of the Convening Authority”, 21 January 2010; “Attorney General Announced Forum Decisions for Guantanamo Detainees”, United States Department of Justice website, op. cit., note 686. 913 United States Military Commission, “Charge Sheet: Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin ‘Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Ali Abdul-Aziz Ali, Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi”, 5 May 2011. 914 ODIHR meeting with the Department of Defense Office of the Chief Defense Counsel, 5 September 2014; ODIHR interview with Matthew O’Hara, op. cit., note 255; ODIHR interview with David Remes, op. cit., note 255; ODIHR interview with Cheryl Bormann, Air Force Captain Michael Schwartz, Navy Reserves Lieutenant Commander James Hatcher and Tim Jon Semmerling, op. cit., note 725. 915 The military commission did find that the FBI questioned al Shibh’s Defense Security Officer, and that another situation had arisen in 2013, which had involved the FBI and a linguist assigned to Khalid Shaikh Mohammad’s team. The FBI also required 164