“substantially supporting” could be interpreted to encompass individuals that never “directly participated in hostilities”.54 117. For the above reasons, the US concepts of “unlawful enemy combatant” and “unprivileged enemy belligerent” do not create a separate status that is outside the protections of international humanitarian law.55 Both combatants and civilians are entitled to the protections provided for in the Geneva Conventions. Combatants56 are entitled to the privileges contained in the Third Geneva Convention.57 Civilians, who meet the nationality 54 Since treaty international humanitarian law does not define the notion of direct participation in hostilities, the ICRC has interpreted it “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its constituent terms in their context and in light of the object and purpose” of international humanitarian law. According to the ICRC interpretation, the notion of direct participation in hostilities refers to “specific acts carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict” irrespective of the international or non-international character of the armed conflict. The ICRC further explained: “‘[P]articipation’ in hostilities refers to the (individual) involvement of a person in these hostilities”. “Acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities must meet three cumulative requirements: (1) a threshold regarding the harm likely to result from the act, (2) a relationship of direct causation between the act and the expected harm, and (3) a belligerent nexus between the act and the hostilities conducted between the parties to an armed conflict.” “[T]here can also be ‘indirect’ participation in hostilities, which does not lead to such loss of protection. Indeed, the distinction between a person’s direct and indirect participation in hostilities corresponds, at the collective level of the opposing parties to an armed conflict, to that between the conduct of hostilities and other activities that are part of the general war effort or may be characterized as war-sustaining activities. Generally speaking, beyond the actual conduct of hostilities, the general war effort could be said to include all activities objectively contributing to the military defeat of the adversary (e.g. design, production and shipment of weapons and military equipment, construction or repair of roads, ports, airports, bridges, railways and other infrastructure outside the context of concrete military operations), while war-sustaining activities would additionally include political, economic or media activities supporting the general war effort (e.g., political propaganda, financial transactions, production of agricultural or non-military industrial goods) (…) Admittedly, both the general war effort and war-sustaining activities may ultimately result in harm reaching the threshold required for a qualification as direct participation in hostilities. Some of these activities may even be indispensable to harming the adversary, such as providing finances, food and shelter to the armed forces and producing weapons and ammunition. However, unlike the conduct of hostilities, which is designed to cause – i.e. bring about the materialization of – the required harm, the general war effort and war sustaining activities also include activities that merely maintain or build up the capacity to cause such harm. (…) For a specific act to qualify as ‘direct’ rather than ‘indirect’ participation in hostilities there must be a sufficiently close causal relation between the act and the resulting harm. Standards such as ‘indirect causation of harm’ or ‘materially facilitating harm’ are clearly too wide, as they would bring the entire war effort within the concept of direct participation in hostilities and, thus, would deprive large parts of the civilian population of their protection against direct attack (…). Therefore, individual conduct that merely builds up or maintains the capacity of a party to harm its adversary, or which otherwise only indirectly causes harm, is excluded from the concept of direct participation in hostilities. (…) Likewise, although the recruitment and training of personnel is crucial to the military capacity of a party to the conflict, the causal link with the harm inflicted on the adversary will generally remain indirect. Only where persons are specifically recruited and trained for the execution of a predetermined hostile act can such activities be regarded as an integral part of that act and, therefore, as direct participation in hostilities.” Melzer, “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities”, op. cit., note 45, pp. 41, 43-54, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf>. See, also, Laura M. Olson, “Guantánamo Habeas Review: Are the D.C. District Court’s Decisions Consistent with Internment Standards”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, December 2009, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515928>. 55 See, for instance, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Martin Scheinin, Report to the General Assembly, A/63/223, 6 August 2008, para. 22, <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/63/223>; UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Report to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, op. cit., note 22, para. 11: “the term ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ is a description of convenience, meaningful only in international armed conflicts, and even then only denoting persons taking a direct part in hostilities while not being members of the regular armed forces or of assimilated units”; “International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts”, ICRC, September 2007, op. cit., note 18, p. 728: “[o]ne of the purposes of the law of war is to protect the life, health and dignity of all persons involved in or affected by armed conflict. It is inconceivable that calling someone an ‘unlawful combatant’ (or anything else) should suffice to deprive him or her of rights guaranteed to every individual under the law”. 56 Article 4 outlines the requirements for an individual to qualify as a prisoner of war. For instance, Article 4(A)(1) entitles “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces” to be treated as prisoners of war. Third Geneva Convention, Art. 4. 57 A combatant has the “right” to participate directly in hostilities and is immune from criminal prosecution for belligerent acts which do not violate international humanitarian law. Upon capture, a combatant is entitled to prisoner of war status. API, Arts. 43(2), 44(1); Third Geneva Convention, Art. 4. 44