external monitoring system of the proceedings.858 These incidents, viewed in light of the over-classification of information related to “high-value detainees”’ treatment in CIA detention, lead to the conclusion that the use of the 40-second delay has not in practice always been necessary and strictly proportionate to safeguard national security. Therefore, they give rise to concern over violations of the right to a public trial provisions as stipulated in Article 14(1) of the ICCPR and OSCE commitments. d. Recommendations • • Regardless of the status of Guantánamo detainees under international law, to ensure that those suspected of a criminal offence are prosecuted before ordinary courts providing sufficient guarantees of independence, impartiality and publicity; To ensure that restrictions to the publicity of any criminal proceeding against Guantánamo detainees are decided on a case-by-case basis and remain proportionate to the need to protect national security or public order. B. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE a. International Standards 359. The presumption of innocence is protected by various international treaties, including Article 14(2) of the ICCPR,859 and by OSCE commitments, such as Copenhagen 1990, which states that the presumption of innocence is “essential to the full expression of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings”.860 360. The presumption of innocence is a fundamental element of a fair trial in criminal proceedings. According to Article 14 of the ICCPR, “[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to 858 During a January 2013 pre-trial hearing, the audio feed of the courtroom was cut for a few minutes by an entity outside the courtroom, later identified as the original classification authority. The feed was cut after a defence counsel mentioned a request to preserve evidence of a CIA detention facility where “high-value detainees”, including the accused, where held prior to their transfer to Guantánamo. Judge Pohl subsequently ruled that the information should not have been kept from the public and summarized it in open court the following day. He also stressed that this was the last time any third party was permitted to unilaterally decide to suspend the broadcast and ordered the government to dismantle the monitoring system. United States Military Commission, United States of America v. Mohammad et al., “Unofficial/unauthenticated transcript of the hearing dated 1/28/2013 from 1:31 PM to 2:46 PM”, pp. 1445-1447; “Statement of Judge Col. James Pohl, 1.31.2013”, 31 January 2013, <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/563738-statement-of-judge-col-james-pohl-jan-31-2013.html>; United States Military Commission, United States of America v. Mohammad et al., “Unofficial/unauthenticated transcript of motions hearing dated 31/01/2013 from 9:01 AM to 09:22 AM”, op. cit., note 816, p. 1720; Jane Sutton, “Judge orders end to secret censorship of Guantanamo court”, Reuters website, 1 February 2013, <http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/usa-guantanamoidINDEE90U0JM20130131>; Wells Bennett and Sophia Brill, “1/28 Hearing #6: Who Hit the Censor Button? And Voluntariness, and a 505(h) Session”, Lawfare website, 28 January 2013, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/01/128-hearing-6who-hit-the-censor-button-and-voluntariness-and-a-505h-session/>; Carol Rosenberg, “Guantánamo spills its secrets slowly, in surprising ways”, Miami Herald website, 2 February 2013, <http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/article3620967.html>; Jason Leopold, "Secret censor revealed at Guantanamo Military Commissions", Truthout website, 29 January 2013, <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/14223-secret-censor-revealed-atguantanamo-military-commissions>. 859 ICCPR, Art. 14(2); ACHR, Art. 8(2); ADRDM, Art. XXVI; UDHR, Art. 11. See, also, “Body of Principles”, op. cit., note 89, Principle 36. 860 OSCE Copenhagen Document, op. cit., note 80, paras. 5, 5.19. 157