hostilities but only “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”.45 As far as the status, rights and protections of persons detained in connection with the war against al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces are concerned, the terms unlawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents are simply “shorthand for persons – civilians – who have directly participated in hostilities in an international armed conflict without being members of the armed forces as defined by [international humanitarian law] and who have fallen into enemy hands”.46 116. The US government did not initially provide full criteria on who it considered to be an “unlawful enemy combatant”.47 As a result, in 2004, the United States Supreme Court created a definition for the purposes of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which defined “enemy combatants” as those who are “part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners” in Afghanistan and who “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States”.48 Subsequently, the US government defined “unlawful enemy combatants” when it established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs). This definition specified that an “unlawful enemy combatant” was “an individual who was part of or supporting” al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces “that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or coalition partners”. It further specified that this definition “includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy 45 API, Art. 51(3): “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”; “International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts”, ICRC, September 2007, op. cit., note 18, p. 727: unlike prisoners of war, civilians that directly participate in hostilities do not receive the combatant’s privilege regarding immunity from criminal prosecution for acts that do not violate international humanitarian law so they may be prosecuted under domestic law for taking part in hostilities; UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism, Report to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, op. cit., note 22, para. 11; Knut Dormann, “The Legal Situation of ‘Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants’”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85. No. 849, March 2003, pp. 47-48, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_849_dorman.pdf>. ODIHR notes that, for the purpose of the principle of distinction – namely to determine who is protected against direct attack during the conduct of hostilities – the ICRC has specified that members of organized armed groups of a non-State party to a noninternational armed conflict are not considered as civilians, and therefore lose protection against direct attack for as long as they carry out their “continuous combat function” (individuals whose continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities are assuming a “continuous combat function”; they are to be distinguished from civilians who directly participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized basis, or who assume exclusively political, administrative or other non-combat functions). However, the status, rights, and protections of persons outside the conduct of hostilities (which are the main focus of this section) in both international and noninternational armed conflicts are not dependent upon their qualification as civilians for the specific purpose of the principle of distinction, but rather on the “precise personal scope of application of the provisions conferring the relevant status, rights, and protections”. Nils Melzer, “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law”, ICRC, May 2009, p. 13 footnote 5 and pp. 27, 31-36, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-0020990.pdf>. 46 “International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts”, ICRC, September 2007, ibid., p. 727; UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Report to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, ibid., para. 11; Dormann, ibid., pp. 47-48. 47 United States Supreme Court, Yaser Esam Hamdi v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696, 28 June 2004, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/542/507/>; United States President George W. Bush, Military Order, “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism”, 13 November 2001, <http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html>: prior to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, President George W. Bush had authorized the detention of an individual who “(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida; (ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and (2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this order.” 48 United States Supreme Court, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, ibid. 42