administration served to institutionalize a system effectively authorizing and perpetuating torture in violation of international law.358 206. A memorandum of 1 August 2002 from the then US Assistant Attorney General to the Acting General Counsel of the CIA analysed, on the basis of the above domestic interpretation of the law and factual information provided by the CIA, the legality of specific techniques that the CIA proposed to use in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The analysis concluded that ten interrogation techniques did not amount to torture, namely attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, insects placed in a confinement box and “waterboarding”, which could potentially be used in combination and in an escalating manner. It considered that no specific intent to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering appeared to be present in the application of these methods.359 Months later, Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense at the relevant time, approved several “counter-resistance techniques” for interrogations at Guantánamo, which included removal of comfort items, “change of scenery down” (removing a detainee to a less pleasant interrogation scene, which “might include exposure to extreme temperatures and deprivation of light and auditory stimuli”), environmental manipulation to create moderate discomfort, sleep adjustment, and isolation.360 358 See, for instance, “Feinstein report: UN expert calls for prosecution of CIA officers and other US Government officials”, OHCHR website, 9 December 2014, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15397&LangID=E>: “there was a clear policy orchestrated at a high level within the Bush administration, which allowed to commit systematic crimes and gross violations of international human rights law.” 359 Bybee, “Memorandum: ‘Interrogation of Al Qaeda Operative’”, op. cit., note 344, pp. 16-18. While this memorandum was specific to the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, the CIA presumably applied these techniques to “numerous other CIA detainees without seeking additional formal legal advice from the [Office of Legal Counsel]”. Reportedly, it was not until the end of July 2003 that “the attorney general stated that the legal principles of the August 1, 2002, memorandum could be applied to other CIA detainees”. Senate Study on the CIA RDI Programme, Executive Summary, op. cit., note 171, p. 411. The August 2002 memorandum describes attention grasp as the “grasping [of] the individual with both hands, one hand on each side of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the same motion as the grasp, the individual is drawn toward the interrogator.” Walling is described a technique whereby an individual “is placed with his heels touching [a flexible false wall] (…) pull[ed] forward and then quickly and firmly push[ed] (…) into the wall. It is [his] shoulder blades that hit the wall. (…) [T]he false wall is in part constructed to create a loud sound (…) that will make the impact seem far worse than it is and that will be far worse than any injury that might result from the action”. Stress positions are said to be “designed to produce the physical discomfort associated with muscle fatigue”, rather than “the pain associated with contortions or twisting of the body”. “Waterboarding” includes the individual being “bound securely to an inclined bench (…). The individual’s feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, air flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth (…). This (…) produces the perception of ‘suffocation and incipient panic’, i.e., the perception of drowning.”, ibid., pp. 2-4. While the memorandum described how the CIA stated the techniques would be used, the Agency reportedly applied them “in a manner that a Department of Justice attorney concluded ‘was quite different from the [description] presented in 2002’”, including during the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. See, for instance, Senate Study on the CIA RDI Programme, Executive Summary, ibid., pp. 411-412. 360 UN Special Procedures, “Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay”, op. cit., note 23, paras. 49-50; United States Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Memorandum for the Commander, United States Southern Command, ‘Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism’”, 16 April 2003, pp. 2-4, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/041603rumsfeld.pdf>. His initial authorization, dated 2 December 2002, included techniques such as stress positions for up to four hours, isolation for up to 30 days, hooding during transportation and questioning, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, removal of all comfort items, forced grooming, removal of clothing, interrogations of up to 20 hours, use of detainees’ phobias to induce stress. He rescinded that authorization in January 2003, and later authorized, in April 2003, the counter-resistance techniques mentioned above. United States Joint Task Force 170, Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Phifer, “Memorandum for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, ‘Request for Approval of Counter-resistance Techniques’”, 11 October 2002, in United States General Counsel William J. Haynes II, “Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, ‘Counter-resistance 86