Box 11.2 Religious Headwear and Uniform Requirements According to the US Supreme Court153 An Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi was ordered not to wear a yarmulke while on duty and in uniform as a commissioned officer in the Air Force at March Air Force Base. This order was pursuant to an Air Force regulation that provides that authorized headgear may be worn out of doors but that indoors “[h]eadgear [may] not be worn ... except by armed security police in the performance of their duties”. The petitioner claimed that this violated the right of free exercise of his freedom of religion under the first Amendment to the US Constitution. The United States Supreme Court held by a majority of 5:4 that there was no violation of the First Amendment since the purpose of the regulation was a legitimate military one.154 In the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, they encouraged “the subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the overall group mission” and “a sense of hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate outward individual distinctions except for those of rank”. It was vital to develop “the necessary habits of discipline and unity” in peacetime in advance of trouble. 153154 Armed forces that fail to take steps to accommodate religious practice will effectively deter religious minorities from enlisting in the regular forces, so that they forfeit the opportunity to discharge civic obligations, with a resulting loss of an available pool of skills and personnel. Such failure may also weaken the allegiance of certain religious sections of the community that the armed forces represent. Even if the requirements in question are “facially neutral” (i.e., they do not refer to religion at all), they may nevertheless constitute a form of indirect religious discrimination. In addition, if religious liberty is taken as a positive right, it could be said to include a duty to protect service personnel from discrimination, bullying, or harassment because of their religion. Recognition of religious freedom in all its aspects presents some difficulties that do not apply to other civil or political rights. The first is assessing the genuineness of religiousfreedom claims based on conscience. Clearly, recognition and accommodation should not be limited to the major religions, e.g., Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, and Buddhism (whose practices and beliefs are generally well known), since to do so would discriminate against minority or new religions. Under human rights treaties, these are equally entitled to respect. In these cases, however, the armed forces are less likely to be familiar with the beliefs in question. Second, some countries, e.g., France and Turkey, have constitutional guarantees of secularity, and others, like the United States, have a separation of church and state. There may be a concern in these cases that state measures that actively facilitate the practice of religion could be found to be unconstitutional. Third, practical difficulties may arise from the complexity of providing equal accommodation for diverse and perhaps conflicting religious practices on certain matters. The question of observance of holy days is the area that demonstrates this most vividly: if the armed forces were to allow time off for all holy days for all religions, it might affect operational efficiency. 153  Goldman v. Weinberger, Supreme Court of the United States, 25 March 1985, United States Reports, Vol. 475, 1985, p. 503. 154  The dissenting judges argued that the Air Force had not sufficiently demonstrated why making an exception to the uniform regulations would compromise military objectives. 89 Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel