Doc. 11302 Report individuals wishing to access classified information were challenged as unconstitutional by the Polish ombudsman.104However, these provisions were compulsory for NATO membership and – of no small coincidence – would transpire to be vital to the preservation of secrecy around the operations of the CIA’s HVD programme in Poland. 3.2.3.2. Application of the NATO framework in Romania 142. In the case of Romania, the processes of acceding to NATO and developing a bilateral framework with the United States, under which the CIA could operate on Romanian territory, proceeded almost simultaneously. 143. According to our sources, the statement of President Ion Iliescu105in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001 was Romania’s “critical turning point”. In that statement, President Iliescu signalled Romania’s intention “to act as a de facto member of the NATO alliance”, setting a clear tone at a time when fellow former eastern-bloc countries were likewise scrambling to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. 144. Indeed, Romania could be said to have outdone even many NATO members in the immediacy of its demonstrations of support for the “war on terror.” In its session of 19 September 2001, the Romanian Parliament gave its “formal approval” to President Iliescu’s stated position and “approved basing and overflight permission for all United States and coalition partners”106– thus pre-empting the North Atlantic Council’s multilateral authorisations of 4 October 2001 by more than two weeks. A source involved in drafting this permission confirmed to us that its scope was deliberately designed to cover aircraft operated by or on behalf of the CIA. 145. Furthermore, the most important domestic implication of the Romanian Parliament’s approval for President Iliescu’s pro-American stance was that, in the process, it effectively mandated the President, working through his Office of National Security, to sign NATO-type agreements and bilateral operational orders with the United States. 146. In exercise of this mandate, President Iliescu negotiated and signed what the Romanian authorities describe as a “SOFA Supplemental”107– the Agreement between Romania and the United States of America regarding the Status of United States Forces in Romania108 – on 30 October 2001. Along with the multilateral NATO SOFA, this agreement is said by the Romanian authorities generally to “settle the jurisdiction, the legal responsibilities and other aspects regarding the status of one party’s armed forces personnel… and of contractors of those armed forces when acting on the other party’s territory”.109In reality, however, they are specifically one-way arrangements, legislating for an increased size and scope of United States activity on Romanian soil. 103. For commentary on the security clearance procedures by a local journalist, see Pawel Wronski, “Przeswietl sie i dowiedz sie. Z tajemnicami do NATO” (Submitting to clearance and getting to know. Our secrets and NATO), in Gazeta Wyborcza, No. 7, 9 and 10 January 1999. 104. See International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Report 2000 (Events of 1999)”, “Annual Report on Poland”, available at http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/ doc_summary.php? sec_id=3&d_id=1784, at p. 286. 105. See Xinhua News Agency, “Romanian President Firmly Condemns Terrorism”, Bucharest, Romania, 11 September 2001; excerpt available as part of a compilation entitled “NATO Aspirant Countries condemn the terrorist attacks on the U.S.A.”, at http://stoianov.president.bol.bg/nato_summit/en/condemnation.html. Just over a year later, in a statement during President Bush’s visit to Bucharest on 23 November 2002, President Iliescu declared that the United States and Romania had “identical positions on the way to address the great challenges that the international community is facing, including the threat of terrorism.” 106. See United States Department of Defense, Fact Sheet of 7 June 2002, “International Contributions to the War against Terrorism”, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/d20020607contributions.pdf. 107. “Answers of the Romanian delegation to the questionnaire on the alleged secret detention centres”, appended to the letter to me from Gyorgy Frunda, Chairperson of the Romanian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 20 January 2006; at p. 1. This agreement is said to be supplementary to the NATO SOFA of 1951, of which Romania only became a party when it joined NATO on 29 March 2004. It should be noted that in 2001, when Romania was not a party to the 1951 Agreement, it at the time relied upon its signature of the PfP SOFA of 1995 as the basis for its supplemental. See Section II.i.d in this report on the wider NATO system and the “war on terror” and the accompanying references, supra note 42. 108. See the “Agreement between Romania and the United States of America regarding the Status of United States Forces” in Romania, signed at Washington DC on 30 October 2001; entered into force on 10 June 2002, TIAS (hereinafter referred to as “Romanian SOFA Supplemental”). For a full record of (unclassified) bilateral treaties between the United States and Romania, see United States Department of State, Treaties in Force: A list of Treaties and other International Agreements of the United States in Force on 1 January 2006, “Romania”, at pp. 270-272. 29