Doc. 11302 Report 185. The aviation services provider customarily used by the CIA,159Jeppesen International Trip Planning, multiple “dummy” flight plans for many of these flights. The “dummy” plans filed by Jeppesen – specifically, for the N379P aircraft – often featured an airport of departure (ADEP) and/or an airport of destination (ADES) that the aircraft never actually intended to visit. If Poland was mentioned at all in these plans, it was usually only by mention of Warsaw as an alternate, or back-up airport, on a route involving Prague or Budapest, for example. Thus the eventual flight paths for N379P registered in Eurocontrol’s records were inaccurate and often incoherent, bearing little relation to the actual routes flown and almost never mentioning the name of the Polish airport where the aircraft actually landed – Szymany. 160filed 186. The Polish Air Navigation Services Agency (Polska Agencja Zeglugi Powietrznej), commonly known as PANSA, also played a crucial role in this systematic cover-up. PANSA’s Air Traffic Control in Warsaw161 navigated all of these flights through Polish airspace, exercising control over the aircraft through each of its flight phases162right up to the last phase, when control was handed over to the authority supervising the airfield at Szymany,163immediately before the aircraft’s landing. PANSA navigated the aircraft in the majority of these cases without a legitimate and complete flight plan having been filed for the route flown. 187. Moreover, in certain instances, PANSA took on the responsibility of filing the onward flight plan for the next leg of the circuit after Szymany. We know that PANSA filed such flight plans in instances where Szymany had been omitted completely from the original Jeppesen flight plans, and where the aircraft was required to fly onwards from Szymany to a destination outside Poland. Similarly, in at least one instance where the aircraft flew onwards from Szymany to Warsaw – and thus did not require initially to leave Polish airspace – PANSA simply navigated the onward flight without a flight plan. 188. It is also noteworthy that Jeppesen appears to have followed PANSA’s contributions to these operations very closely, acting upon responses from the flight management system to PANSA’s communications within minutes of their being received. Furthermore, both Jeppesen and PANSA have coordinated their actions with the in-flight communications from the aircraft’s pilot-in-command.164 159. Jeppesen International Trip Planning is the travel service of Jeppesen Dataplan, an aviation services provider based in San Jose, California and a subsidiary of Boeing, the world’s largest aerospace company. On 30 May 2007, the ACLU announced a lawsuit against Jeppesen Dataplan for its involvement in the renditions of three individuals: Ahmed Agiza, Binyam Mohamed and El-Kassim Britel. See American Civil Liberties Union, “ACLU Sues Boeing Subsidiary for Participation in CIA Kidnapping and Torture Flights”, 30 May 2007, available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/ torture/ 29920prs20070530.html. For the first revelations about Jeppesen’s involvement in CIA detainee transfers, including the rendition of Khaled El-Masri, see Jane Mayer, “Outsourcing: The CIA’s Travel Agent”, in The New Yorker, 30 October 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/30/061030ta_talk_mayer. The Managing Director of Jeppesen is quoted in the article as having said: “We do all the extraordinary rendition flights – you know, the torture flights. Let’s face it, some of these flights do end up that way.” 160. Communications, notably flight plans, filed by Jeppesen International Trip Planning are identified in the AFTN system by the use of the company’s “originator address”, which is KSFOXLDI. 161. The entire national airspace of Poland comprises one single Flight Information Region (FIR), denoted by the fourletter code EPWW. Poland therefore has only one Area Control Centre (ACC). All air traffic into Poland is controlled by the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency, PANSA, from its Air Traffic Management Centre at Warsaw Airport. For an excellent overview of Polish Air Traffic Control, see PANSA, “Air Traffic Control”, available at http://www.polatca.pansa.pl/ kontrola_eng.htm. 162. We have identified the relevant “data strings” communications about these flights being sent from the AFTN address “EPWAZPZX”, which denotes the “Approach Control Centre – Air Traffic Service Reporting Office at Warsaw Airport”. In addition to the phase of general “Region Control” for all of Poland, the phase of “Approach Control” for Szymany Airport, during which the movements of all civil or military aircraft are controlled within a specified range of the airport, is dealt with from Warsaw. Szymany Airport does not meet the criteria (that is to say passenger airports that maintain fixed flight connections) to have its own Approach Control unit so it relies on the unit at Warsaw Airport. 163. We have identified the relevant “data strings” communications about these flights being sent to the AFTN address “EPSYYDYX”, which denotes the “Authority Supervising the Aerodrome at Szymany Airport”. Several airport officials who were present at Szymany Airport when these flights arrived in 2003 have told us that their notification came from military sources in Warsaw and that all arrangements for the landings were handled using special military units on the ground. Polish Air Traffic Control explains these procedures in the following terms: “Military operations carried out in the military aerodrome zones are controlled by a military unit that directly co-operates with the approach control.” From our Polish insider sources, we know that the Director of Military Operations, working with PANSA Approach Control in Warsaw, as well as key officials in the border guards who notified Szymany of the landings, and military officers who took over from civilian officials at Szymany to deal with them on the ground, were working on behalf of Polish military intelligence in collaboration with the CIA. 39