Doc. 11302 Report structure, which purport to immunise them from manipulation along party-political lines. The SRI and the SIE operate independently of government and are not subordinated to the incumbent executive. They are each subjected to parliamentary scrutiny through dedicated special parliamentary committees.180The Supreme Council of National Defence (Consiliul Suprem de Aparare a Tarii, or CSAT), an autonomous administrative body chaired by the non-partisan office of the president,181organises and continually monitors the activities of the SRI and the SIE, in line with its mandate to co-ordinate the overall national security and defence of the country. As such, the possibilities for a handful of people at the heart of government to use the SRI or the SIE to pursue their own personal, political or strategic agenda are exceedingly narrow. 205. In contrast, intelligence gathering in the military sphere is a competence formally overseen by the Ministry of National Defence,182through its General Directorate for Defence Intelligence (Directia Generala de Informatii a Apararei, or DGIA). What little parliamentary scrutiny of defence intelligence is supposed to exist183certainly does not apply to its organisational, planning or operational aspects. On the contrary, strict compatibility with NATO structures, insisted upon as a criteria for NATO accession, means that the majority of Romanian military intelligence activities are kept secret from all but those who “need to know”. 206. According to our sources, the relevant sub-unit of the DGIA that worked with the CIA on its clandestine operations was the Directorate for Military Intelligence and Representation (Directia Informatii si Reprezentare Militara, or DIRM), also known as the “J2” unit. This unit was not involved in transporting, holding or interrogating any detainees – since these were tasks performed solely by the Americans – but, according to one Romanian officer, the “J2” officers “co-operated and adjusted” to accommodate the CIA personnel’s needs. 207. As part of a wider restructuring of the DGIA in 2003,184the “J2” unit increased in scope and importance at a very strategic moment in Romania’s co-operation with the United States, just as American forces were deploying into the country in large numbers to launch their aerial missions into Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom.185The place at which these United States forces were stationed, the 86th Air Force Base at Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield,186became the most significant point in the country for a whole range of collaborative activities in a “partnership” between Romanian and American personnel. 179. For the SRI, see the Law on the Organisation and Functioning of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), Law No. 14/1992; for the SIE, see the Law on the Organisation and Functioning of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), Law No. 1/1998. 180. For the SRI, see the Decision of the Romanian Parliament on the Organisation and Functioning of the Joint Committee of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies for Parliamentary Oversight of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), Decision No. 30/1993; for the SIE, see the Decision of the Romanian Parliament on the Organisation and Functioning of the Special Committee for Parliamentary Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), Decision No. 44/1998. Indeed, some commentators say that the increased transparency and growing public trust in the SRI and the SIE owe largely to the strength of these parliamentary accountability mechanisms. See, for example, Watts, “Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania”, ibid.: “Romania’s semi-presidential system has proven itself capable of blocking the over-accumulation and over-centralisation of power by government executives.” 181. In addition to the President (Chair), the membership of the CSAT includes: the Prime Minister (Vice-Chair); the Ministers of Defence, Economy and Commerce, Finance, Justice, Interior and Administrative Reform, and Foreign Affairs; the Directors of the SRI and SIE; the Presidential Adviser on National Security; and the Chief of General Staff; see the CSAT website at: http://csat.presidency.ro/. The CSAT is regulated under a 2002 statute – Law No. 415/2002 – and its activities are themselves reported regularly to the Parliamentary Committee for Defence, Public Order and Security. For further discussion on related matters, see also Karoly Szabo, “Parliamentary Overview of Intelligence Services in Romania”, workshop paper published by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), delivered at the workshop on “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services”, Geneva, 3 to 5 October 2002, copy on file with the rapporteur. 182. The Ministry of National Defence (Ministerul Apararii Nationale) was renamed as the Ministry of Defence (Ministerul Apararii) in April 2007. I have used its old name, which applied in the period in question. 183. Formally speaking, military intelligence activities are supposed to be subject to the same parliamentary scrutiny as all the activities of the Ministry of National Defence, namely through the Committees on Defence, Public Order and National Security in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies of the Romanian Parliament. In reality, these committees are far removed from the actual work of the DGIA services. 184. See, for example, Doru Dragomir, “Hurricane in the Army’s Secret Services”, Bucharest Ziua, 9 April 2003, at p. 9; available online at http://www.ziua.net/. 185. Between February and June 2003, United States armed forces (both the air force and ground troops) deployed an expeditionary group for operations in Iraq at the 86th Air Force Base – Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield (“MK Airfield”), near Constanta, Romania. According to Romanian military personnel at the airfield, the deployment reached up to “5 000 bodies” at its peak, albeit that most of the troops were only there temporarily, or in transit. MK Airfield was used for the purpose of “regrouping and resupplying air deployments before entering action in theatre in Iraq”. 44