Doc. 11302 Report 354. The third definition we must clarify is that of the “combatant”. The strategic choice of the Bush administration to persist with the “war on terror” metaphor has ultimately had the effect of “conferring on suspected terrorists the elevated status of combatants”303– when in reality they ought to be dealt with in the same manner as other members of international criminal networks, such as arms traders, drug smugglers or human traffickers. I believe that giving such status to members of al-Qaeda has served to galvanise its leadership and reinforce its self-perception as a revolutionary “people’s army.” Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and other HVDs have capitalised on their status to send “political” messages during their CSRT hearings at Guantánamo Bay.304I also agree with the United States Army’s own assessment that “insurgents” given a sense of legitimacy will surely harden as adversaries, not least in their effective resistance to interrogation.305 9.2. Towards consensus standards on interrogation techniques 355. It has now been widely agreed in America and internationally that the “enhanced interrogation techniques”306used on the CIA’s “high-value” detainees in secret detention overstepped the mark in terms of what is legal, moral and effective. Two very recent commentaries in this area – one by a UN special rapporteur307and one by an expert group of American “intelligence scientists”308– provide arguments in favour of review and strict regulation of interrogation techniques. 356. The UN rapporteur, Martin Scheinin, has re-emphasised that many interrogation techniques in which “the CIA has indeed been involved, and continues to be involved”, in his assessment “involve conduct that amounts to a breach of the non-derogable right to be free from torture and any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”309 303. See Human Rights First, “Testimony of Elisa Massimino before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services”, 29 March 2007, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/. HRF made a compelling case to Congress to review several of the problematic definitions I have discussed here: “How we treat our terrorist suspects – including how we try them – speaks volumes about who we are as a nation, and our confidence in the institutions and values that set us apart. The distinction between the United States and its terrorist enemies has narrowed over the course of this conflict.” 304. I refer here to the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) hearings in which KSM and other detainees among the 14 HVDs at Guantánamo Bay appeared earlier this year, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/ Detainee_Affairs/. See, for example, Department of Defense, “Unclassified Verbatim Transcript of CSRT Hearing for ISN 10024” [known to be Khalid Sheikh Mohamed], 10 March 2007. KSM declared himself a “combatant” with the phrase: “For sure, I am American enemies.” He also attempted to position himself as a “revolutionary” by stating: “we [al-Qaeda] consider we and George Washington doing same thing.” 305. In this regard, see United States Department of Defense, Army Field Manual on Interrogation, FM3-24/MCWP3-33.5, December 2006, at pp. 1-23. Under the section entitled “Counterinsurgency”, the manual states: “It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent [because] dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. Skilful counterinsurgents must thus cut off the sources of that recuperative power.” One such source is said to be the status afforded to an insurgent by his enemy. 306. Six of these “enhanced interrogation techniques” were described in an ABC News report in November 2005, summarised as follows: “waterboarding” (induced fear of drowning on a detainee strapped to a board); “cold cell” (naked at 50 degrees Fahrenheit, repeatedly doused with cold water); “long-time standing” (shackled in a stress position for up to forty hours, causing extreme pain and sleep deprivation); “attention slap” (open-handed strike across the face); “belly slap” (hard, open-handed strike to the stomach); and “attention grab” (taking hold of the detainee’s shirt, shaking forcefully). See Brian Ross and Richard Esposito, “CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described – Sources Say Agency’s Tactics Lead to Questionable Confessions, Sometimes to Death”, ABC News, 18 November 2005, available at: http:// abcnews.go.com/WNT/ Investigation/story?id=1322866. 307. See Martin Scheinin, UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, “Press Conference discussing Preliminary Findings on Visit to United States”, 16 to 25 May 2007 (hereinafter “Scheinin, ‘Preliminary Findings on Visit to the United States’”). 308. See United States National Defense Intelligence College, Intelligence Science Board, “Educing Information – Interrogation: Science and Art (Foundations for the Future)”, Phase I Report, Washington DC, completed December 2006 – released 29 May 2007 (hereinafter “Intelligence Science Board, Educing Information”). 309. See Scheinin, “Preliminary Findings on Visit to the United States”, supra note 307. 68