Doc. 11302 Report regime instituted under the NATO Security Policy. As in several other eastern European countries who adopted more stringent secrecy policies as part of their NATO accession, Romania’s legislation on classified information was expedited through parliament129and criticised by civil society for being unbalanced.130 156. The second reference was part of an apparent acceptance, in principle, that United States agencies and personnel have carried out detainee transfer operations in Romania in the context of the NATO framework. The following statement was delivered by the Chairperson of the Romanian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly, Mr Gyorgy Frunda, during the Parliamentary Assembly plenary debate on my report in June 2006: “Concerning the transfer of prisoners, from the first moment we said that Romania collaborated with the United States and with other members of NATO. Aircraft landed in Romania and transported persons. We did not and do not know who the persons are because, do not forget, the aircraft are under the authority of the countries where they are registered. The countries in which the airports are located do not have legal instruments to see what happens on board. That is why United States authorities have to answer not only political but juridical questions about whether persons were harassed or wrongly treated … on the airplanes.”131 157. Our continuing investigations since June 2006 have allowed us to put this statement into context. Romania is right to state that the NATO framework on the multilateral level did enable detainee transfers through many Council of Europe member states, including larger nations like Germany mentioned in my report last year. Romania, like Poland, went beyond the multilateral framework, however, when it expanded the scope and purpose of the authorisations it granted the United States. According to one of our sources involved in making the key bilateral arrangements, Romania “knew what the United States needed from its allies and in what areas we could assist them”. It was therefore perceived to be in the national interest to extend a further level of support: “[having] worked on the secret flights … we worked directly with associates of the CIA on establishing prisons here.” 3.2.3.3. Preserving secrecy through military intelligence partnerships 158. In the course of our discussions with intelligence officials in the United States, a senior member of the CIA Counter-Terrorism Center made the following remarks to our team: “Many European countries have multiple security services. And in most countries the Agency deals with all of them: with the police, with the anti-terrorism police, with foreign intelligence, with other units – and of course with military intelligence … But for the HVD programme we worked strictly in line with ‘needto-know’”. 159. There are two essential items of information in this statement, both of which have ultimately proved indispensable to our understanding of how the HVD programme worked in Europe. One item – military intelligence partnerships – goes to the heart of how the CIA formed its relationships; the other – preservation of secrecy – reveals important structural considerations. I shall deal with the structural considerations first. 128. See the “Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the Protection of Military Classified Information”, done in Washington, 21 June 1995, entered into force 2003; cited ibid. 129. Alasdair Roberts cites a revealing news report about the passage of the Romanian legislation in April 2002: “[On 3 April] a certain Colonel Constantin Raicu [of the Romanian Intelligence Service], who is in charge of the protection of state secrets, came down like a storm on the members of the Senate Juridical Commission, telling them: ‘This morning we have received signals from [NATO in] Brussels indicating that if the bill on classified information is not passed before 16 April, they cannot exclude adopting a critical attitude regarding Romania. We agree with any form – the colonel added – but please, pass it as soon as possible, or we will be facing huge problems.’ The Senators … grasped the situation very quickly, and they approved the draft bill in the form passed by the Chamber of Deputies.” See Bucharest Ziua, “NATO used as a Scarecrow to pass Law on Secrets,” 8 April 2002, www.ziua.ro, cited in Alasdair Roberts, “NATO, Secrecy and the Right to Information”, supra note 56, at p. 87. 130. See International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Report 2002 (Events of 2001)”, “Annual Report on Romania”, available at http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/ doc_summary.php? sec_id=3&d_id=1782, at p. 257. 131. Contribution of Mr Gyorgy Frunda, chairperson of the delegation of Romania to the Parliamentary Assembly, at the 17th Sitting of the plenary of the Parliamentary Assembly during its 2006 Ordinary Session, Strasbourg, 27 June 2006. 32