that the allegations in the communication cannot be regarded as constituting a violation of any of the rights enumerated in the Covenant. More in particular, the Government is not aware of any right laid down in the Covenant to see someone else prosecuted. Furthermore, the allegations have not been substantiated in such a way as to credibly support a claim regarding such a violation 5.1 In a submission dated 6 April 1987, the author comments on the State party's charge that he had been arrested because of throwing stones at the United States consulate during a demonstration. He affirms that he only demonstrated and that he was caught violently by the neck by two men when he tried to leave the building where the demonstration was being held. One of the men, an officer of the Royal Military Police, hit him in the face several times. The policemen were dressed as civilians and did not identify themselves. The author claims that he did not resist, and that immediately after the arrest he was taken off in a police car by the two officers. He was released after being detained for four days, during which he was brought to the hospital every day. 5.2 The author states that, in the civil proceedings against the officer of the Royal Military Police which remain sub judice, five witnesses testified on his behalf, all of whom confirmed that he did not resort to violence during the demonstration in question. Although not currently experiencing any physical effects of the maltreatment suffered at the hands of the police officers, he still suffers from psychological trauma. He encloses the report from the psychiatrist who treated him, according to which there are unmistakable links between the way the author was treated during his arrest and detention and his subsequent psychological disturbances, e. g., the continuing fear of being attacked in the street. 5.3 He reiterates that the right to test the decision of whether or not to prosecute somebody by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law is a right enshrined in article 14 of the Covenant, and that there is also a right, in a suit at law, to be safeguarded against military arbitrariness. 6.1 By further decision under rule 91, dated 6 April 1988, the Working Group of the Human Rights Committee requested the State party, inter alia, to clarify (a) why the author was subjected to detention for four days; (b) whether the author was brought before a judge or judicial officer during this period; (c). whether he could have invoked the principle of habeas corpus during this period; (d) the extent to which the competent military authorities investigated the author's complaint; and (e) whether any written decision was handed down by the Military Prosecutor, explaining why no criminal proceedings against Mr. O. were initiated: in the affirmative, to provide the Committee with the text; in the negative, to clarify the Military Prosecutor's reasons for not indicting Mr. O. 6.2 The Working Group also requested the author (a) to clarify his allegation that he was subjected to illtreatment during detention in March 1982; (b) to forward to the Committee an English translation of (i) his complaint of 22 April 1982 to the Court of First Instance; and (ii) his legal brief in the civil proceedings against Mr. O.; and (c) to indicate the current stage of the latter proceedings. 7.1 In its reply dated 17 June 1988, the State submits, with regard to the author's arrest and detention: The plaintiff arrived at the police station at 21.30 hours on Friday, 19 March 1982, and was immediately brought before an assistant public prosecutor. The plaintiff, who was suspected of assault, a criminal offence under article 141 of the Criminal Code, was questioned on the morning of Saturday, 20 March 1982, and a chief superintendent of the municipal police, acting as assistant public prosecutor, ordered him to be remanded in police custody as from 12.30 hours for a maximum of two days. The interests of the investigation required that the suspect should remain in the hands of the judicial authorities to allow for further questioning and the examination of witnesses. After telephone consultations between the assistant public prosecutor and the public prosecutor, the public prosecutor extended the remand order for a maximum of two days from 12.30 hours on Monday, 22 March 1982. The advocate on duty was 37