considerably if the Supreme Court should grant a direct appeal. Accordingly, the State party submits that the exhaustion of domestic remedies in Norway would not be unreasonably prolonged and that the authors could, at the very least, have brought the matter before the Court of First Instance. Moreover, the State party observes that the authors' objection that their daughter would be out of the day nursery by the time of the final judgement and that, therefore, it would be futile to go to the courts applies equally to an eventual decision by the Human Rights Committee and its possible incorporation into Norwegian law and practice. Thus, the State party concludes that there is no urgency that could justify bypassing domestic remedies and appealing directly to the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 4.4 In its further submission under rule 91, dated 24 February 1988, the State party explains that everyone having a "legal interest" may bring his/her case before the ordinary courts in order to test the legality of any act, i. e. also the Day Nurseries Act. This opportunity was also open to the complainants when they in the spring of 1987 decided to submit the matter directly to the Human Rights Committee. 4.5 The State party further reiterates that the Norwegian courts have given considerable weight to international treaties and conventions in the interpretation of domestic rules, even if these instruments have not been formally incorporated into domestic law. It points to several Supreme Court decisions concerning the relationship between international human rights instruments and domestic law and concerning possible conflicts between the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and domestic statutes. Although the Supreme Court has, in these cases, ruled that there was no conflict between the domestic law and the relevant international instrument, it has expressed clearly that international rules are to be taken into consideration in the interpretation of domestic law. In this context, the State party reiterates that "the possibility of setting aside a national statute altogether on the grounds of conflict with the Covenant cannot be disregarded" and emphasizes that in every case in which international human rights instruments have become relevant, the Supreme Court has taken a decision on the issue of conflict between a domestic statute and the international instrument and has not refused to test it. In a recent case, for example, the question was whether a private school for educating social workers owned by a Christian foundation was allowed to ask job applicants (future teachers) about their religious beliefs. In this case the court expressed a clear opinion on the legal relevance of the international rules when interpreting domestic law. The first voting judge, who was supported by a unanimous court, stated: "I do not find it questionable that the convention (IL0 Convention No. 111) must be given weight in the interpretation of section 55 A of the Working Environment Act of 1977". The further vote also shows that the convention is given considerable attention and weight". (Norsk Rettstidende 1986, pp. 1250 ff.) 4.6 In the light of the above observations, the State party argues that the authors would have stood a good chance of testing, before the Norwegian courts, the compatibility of the Day Nurseries Act with the Covenant. Thus, they could have invoked the Covenant and asked the courts that the Act be interpreted in the light of that legal instrument and that the Christian object clause be declared invalid as being incompatible with it. Moreover, they could have argued that the Act is in conflict with article 2 (1) of the Norwegian Constitution, under which "all inhabitants of the Kingdom shall have the right to free exercise of their religion". In the interpretation of this provision, international human rights instruments would be important elements to be considered by the judge. 5.1 On 10 September 1987 and 5 April 1988, the authors forwarded their comments in reply to the State party's observations on the admissibility of the communication. 5.2 The authors contest the State party's argument that the communication is inadmissible on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They state that while the Norwegian Government contends that they should have submitted their case to the domestic courts, their main argument is that the domestic courts would be an inappropriate forum to decide the issue at stake. They stress that they have not argued that the practice followed by Norwegian day nurseries is in conflict with the Day Nurseries Act and its by-laws, but with international human 50