CAT/C/71/D/908/2019 case, to ensure that they had a solid basis for making a well-informed, transparent and reasonable risk assessment concerning the complainant’s need for protection in Sweden.13 4.8 Regarding the claims of the complainant before the domestic authorities, the State party submits that during the initial asylum proceedings, the complainant stated that a forcible return to Afghanistan would put him at risk of being killed by the Taliban or because he was a Hazara. The State party submits that the domestic migration authorities based their assessment of his stated need for protection on his oral account, as well as on the evidence adduced by him, thus the Swedish Migration Agency and the Migration Court thoroughly examined the facts of the complainant’s case by considering whether his claims were coherent and detailed and whether they contradicted generally known facts or available country-of-origin information. The domestic migration authorities considered that the complainant had plausibly demonstrated that there was a threat against him from the Taliban in Ghazni Province. However, the Agency held that it was both reasonable and relevant for the complainant to flee internally to Herat Province, since there was nothing to indicate that the Taliban would look for him there. On appeal, the Migration Court also held that the complainant had not plausibly demonstrated that there was a threat against him from the Taliban in Herat or Kabul or because he was a Hazara. The State party argues that it finds no reason to diverge from domestic authorities’ assessment in this regard. 4.9 Regarding the complainant’s claim about the risk to him because of his conversion to Christianity, the State party does not question that he has been baptized and has been part of a Christian congregation in Sweden. However, it found, in common with the domestic migration authorities, that the complainant’s written evidence could not be considered sufficient to plausibly demonstrate that his professed Christian faith, and, consequently, his stated religious activities, have been based on genuine and personal religious convictions.14 4.10 The State party also notes that the author did not cite his alleged interest or faith in Christianity as a ground for protection in the early stage of examination of his asylum claim. The complainant did not mention his conversion until 27 April 2017, in connection with his appeal, and his alleged baptism took place only a week later, on 4 May 2017. The State party notes that during the asylum investigation on 7 February 2017, that is, barely three months earlier, the complainant stated that his religious affiliation was Shia Muslim. 15 Furthermore, at that point there was no mention of any interest by the complainant in the Christian religion, and when asked, the complainant confirmed that he had cited all grounds for protection, although during the Migration Court’s oral hearing the complainant claimed that he had felt drawn to Christianity as soon as he had arrived in Sweden in 2016, and had started to participate in church activity in the same year. Against this background, the Migration Court considered it remarkable that he had not cited his interest in Christianity as a ground for 13 14 15 In this connection, the State party recalls the Committee’s Views, in which it has been confirmed that the Committee is not an appellate, quasi-judicial or administrative body and that considerable weight will be given to findings of facts made by organs of the State party concerned (see, for example, N.Z.S. v. Sweden (CAT/C/37/D/277/2005), para. 8.6; N.S. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/44/D/356/2008), para. 7.3; and S.K. et al. v. Sweden (CAT/C/54/D/550/2013), para. 7.4). Moreover, the State party invokes the Committee’s jurisprudence that held that it is for the courts of States parties to the Convention, and not for the Committee, to evaluate the facts and evidence in a particular case, unless it can be ascertained that the manner in which such facts and evidence were evaluated was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice (see, for example, G.K. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/30/D/219/2002), para. 6.12). The Migration Court’s assessment in this regard is in line with a guiding judgment from the Migration Court of Appeal (MIG 2011:29), which holds that general statements about a person being a Christian cannot be afforded any decisive probative value, and an overall assessment is therefore made of the circumstances in which the complainant’s stated conversion took place and of whether he or she could be expected to live as a convert upon return to Afghanistan. The State party also submits that the assessment by the migration authorities was in accordance with the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the same organization’s guidelines on international protection regarding religion-based refugee claims. The timing given here is slightly different than in the complainant’s allegation that his conversion was first brought up as a ground for protection in a complementary appeal to the Migration Court on 10 May 2017. 5