and 6.5 to the effect that the author is neither a "victim" in the present case in the sense of article 22, in that he was not a party to the proceedings against Pinochet in Spain, nor that it has been demonstrated that the exhaustion of domestic remedies in the form of an appeal of amparo to the Constitutional Court would be a priori futile. It would have been consistent with the Committee's practice, once the inadmissibility of this case became clear on either or both of these formal grounds, to conclude its consideration at that point. Instead, for reasons that are not clear from the text of the majority's decision, the majority has elected to engage in a complex discussion on the scope of the jurisdictional articles of the Convention which would have been more appropriately considered under the merits of the case had it been admissible. In procedural law, the first action of a judicial or quasijudicial body, such as the Committee, is to satisfy itself that it is appropriately seized of a matter; this has always been the Committee's previous practice. And should it not be appropriately seized thereof, notably in the case of inadmissibility, the sole decision to be taken, after having indicated the reasons therefor, should be to conclude with declaring the case inadmissible without delving into its merits. In my view, the majority has come to a premature interpretation of articles 5, 8, 9, 13 and 14. The majority considers that, as article 5 provides for jurisdiction to be exercised by a State party in cases where the victim is a national of that State "if that State considers it appropriate", a State possesses a discretion at all points of an investigation and prosecution as to whether it should pursue proceedings in such a case. This view neglects a variety of issues: (a) It would appear to follow from the scheme of the Convention, including the placement of article 5 and its surrounding articles, as well as the entirety of the text of article 5, that the option in article 5, paragraph 1 (c), is to leave to States the ability to elect, when implementing the Convention into domestic law, whether or not they will confer, in principle, jurisdiction over nationals who are extraterritorial victims of torture upon their investigative and prosecutory bodies. The travaux préparatoires and State practice look to confirm that the option contained in article 5, paragraph 1 (c), is aimed at the adoption of generally applicable norms of criminal law by which a State party confers upon its authorities of the ability to investigate and prosecute any and all such cases. Spain, among other States, has elected to exercise that option and confer such extraterritorial jurisdiction upon its investigative and prosecutory authorities. It was pursuant to this jurisdiction, which was confirmed by proceedings in the Audiencia Nacional at an early stage, that the Spanish authorities were able to initiate their investigation of General Pinochet. It is therefore difficult to understand why the discretion in article 5, paragraph 1 (c), should, for States parties that have made the election to assume such jurisdiction, thereupon further extend to each individual case investigated and prosecuted pursuant to this jurisdiction. In this light, it seems that the majority has confused, on the one hand, the possibility to assume a (usually legislative) norm of general application concerning investigation and prosecution of acts of falling within article 5, paragraph 1 (c), with, on the other hand, the pursuit of each individual