case. (b) The majority's reasoning that the discretion contained in article 5 has further meaning beyond that outlined and that the Convention does not require an extradition request to be made is difficult to square both with the majority's own emphasis on the object of the Convention to deny impunity and to the consistent theme running through the Convention that States parties with jurisdiction over an alleged act of torture should exercise such means at their disposal to bring the alleged offender to justice. The majority's view of the "discretion" in article 5 significantly weakens the likelihood that alleged offenders in cases of torture of extraterritorial nationals will be brought to justice, certainly as compared to the cases in article 5, paragraph 1 (a) and (b), where no such discretion applies. Even if the Committee is correct that the Convention does not operate to require a State to lodge an extradition request in a case where it has jurisdiction under its law, the Committee fails to explain why it should also be concluded that extradition proceedings should be able to be discontinued at any point. There are strong policy reasons, again derived from the scheme and object of the Convention, that an extradition request, once made, should be prosecuted through to its conclusion. It does not follow that to allow a discretion on whether to initiate an extradition request also requires a discretion effectively to discontinue the request at any time to be afforded. Even if it is correct that the Convention allows a discretion to discontinue requests for extradition, the majority wholly fails to address the central point in this case as to which body should be exercising such a discretion. The Committee's consistent preference has been, in numerous contexts, for judicial resolution of allegations of torture arising within a State party. In this case, the State party's legal order confers upon its judiciary the ability to investigate cases of extraterritorial nature, to prosecute such cases, to seek extradition requests and to assess the legal implications of decisions in extradition requests and to draw the necessary conclusions. Accordingly, the State party's judiciary in this case determined that there were grounds for a legal challenge to the Home Secretary's decision to terminate the extradition proceedings. Another branch of the State party's government, having theretofore acted in an essentially administrative capacity, frustrated the judicial decision to appeal the Home Secretary's decision by failing to transmit it to the English authorities. It is more than questionable whether such an exercise of "discretion" by the executive is consistent with the principles underlying the Convention, and with the expressed will of the international community to end impunity for the authors of crimes against humanity. The majority's decision in effect deprives the author of the ability to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the issues raised, being avenues which the State party itself recognises have not been exhausted, and of thereafter returning before the Committee.