nor consider it to be a form of torture,410 it was claimed that a violation would arise because the conditions on death row amounted to a breach of Article 3. The reasoning in Soering v UK has been revisited in subsequent cases and expansive jurisprudence on this issue has arisen.413 One of the key cases in this body of jurisprudence is Cruz Varas v Sweden.414 The case involved the potential expulsion of two Chilean applicants for political asylum on the grounds that they had not invoked sufficiently strong political reasons to be considered refugees. The applicants submitted that they faced a real risk of being tortured if they were expelled to Chile, where they claimed to have been tortured previously. The Court held that “substantial grounds” must be shown for believing in the existence of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3.415 This would be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known at the time of the expulsion, although this would not preclude the consideration of information which came to light after the Article 2(1) of the Convention reads: “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.” 411 Soering v UK (1989), op. cit., §92. Note that it was not claimed that the conditions would amount to torture. 412 Of course, where the receiving State is a party to the European Convention, a separate issue arises as to its own responsibility. 413 See, for example, Cruz Varas and Others v Sweden, no. 15576/89, ECHR (Series A) No. 201, judgement of 20 March 1991; Vilvarajah and Others v UK, nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87 and 13448/87, ECHR (Series A) No. 215, judgement of 30 October 1991; H.L.R. v France (1997), op. cit.; D v UK (1997), op. cit.; Jabari v Turkey, no. 40035/98, ECHR 2000-VIII, judgement of 11 July 2000; Naoumenko v Ukraine, no. 42023/98, judgement of 10 February 2004; Öcalan v Turkey (2005), op. cit. 414 Cruz Varas and Others v Sweden (1991), op. cit. 415 Ibid. §76. 2 The European Regional System As regards the duty to protect individuals, the Court held that the UK would violate Article 3 were Soering to be extradited, because he would be exposed to a “real risk” of inhuman or degrading treatment.411 In other words, the violation in such circumstances attaches not to the receiving State because of what it might do, but to the returning State for exposing the individual to ill-treatment.412 The Court thus took an indirect approach to the question of the death penalty, considering that the death penalty itself does not violate the Convention, but that exposure of an individual to the conditions on death row would amount to treatment contrary to Article 3. A State is thus obliged to ensure that individuals do not risk exposure to ill-treatment following extradition or expulsion. 410 85