CCPR/C/123/D/2537/2015 for the purposes of admissibility and concludes that they are inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.6 The Committee takes note of the author’s allegations that the State party violated his right to equality before the courts and before the law and his right to a fair trial, as established in articles 14 (1) and 26 of the Covenant, since he was not treated in the same manner as his co-defendants in the trial; that the sentence imposed by the Supreme Court was disproportionate; that there was no equality of arms between the defence and the prosecution during the trial; that the Attorney General had already expressed a view on his case; and that the lead Supreme Court judge was in a situation of conflict of interest (para. 3.4). The Committee also takes note of the State party’s arguments that the criminal proceedings brought against the author followed the procedure used for trials involving citizens who, because of the duties they perform, as senior government officials, enjoy parliamentary immunity; that the lead judge sought to recuse herself only from the decision as to the point of the trial from which the number of representatives of the victims should be limited; that the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court refused to accept her recusal because it considered there to be no direct or indirect correlation between the case in which the judge was a victim and the author’s case; and that the Attorney General delegated her duties to another prosecutor who took part in the preparatory hearing and the oral proceedings (paras. 4.4, 4.5, 4.7, 4.10 and 6.3). The State party also maintains that the sentence imposed is not disproportionate and is consistent with legally established sentencing guidelines, taking account of the author’s status as a former senior official and as the highest authority of a State entity, and that the other co-defendants, who received more lenient sentences, were rewarded for cooperating with the judiciary and agreeing to early termination of their trials (para. 4.9). In view of the foregoing, the Committee concludes that the author has failed to sufficiently substantiate these claims for purposes of admissibility and therefore declares them inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.7 The Committee takes note of the author’s claims under article 14 (2) and (3) (a), (b) and (c) of the Covenant that his right to be presumed innocent has been violated by the State party (para. 3.5); that he did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence, since the authorities denied him access to evidence and the Supreme Court did not admit evidence essential for his defence; and that he was not tried without undue delay (paras. 3.6, 3.7, 5.8, 7.2 and 7.3). The Committee also notes the State party’s observations that the author had access to all facilities needed to prepare his defence and submit evidence in the criminal proceedings, and that all evidence was duly evaluated by the judicial authorities (paras. 4.6, 4.11 and 4.12). The Committee notes that the author’s allegations concerning the essential nature of the evidence that was not admitted and the alleged failure to try him without undue delay are insufficiently substantiated. Further, his allegations relate primarily to the evaluation of the facts and evidence conducted by the State party’s courts. The Committee recalls its case law according to which it is incumbent on the courts of States parties to evaluate the facts and the evidence in each case, or the application of domestic legislation, unless it can be shown that such evaluation or application was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 6 The Committee has examined the materials submitted by the parties, including the Supreme Court ruling, and considers that these materials do not show that the criminal proceedings against the author suffered from such defects. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the author has failed to provide sufficient substantiation of his claim of a violation of his right to a defence as enshrined in article 14 (2) and (3) (a), (b) and (c) of the Covenant and that the communication is therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.8 The Committee takes note of the author’s claims under article 14 (7) of the Covenant that he was tried twice for the same acts (para. 3.10). The Committee notes, however, that, from the information provided by the parties (para. 4.8), it is not possible to conclude that the penalties imposed upon the author by the Attorney General’s Office, within the framework of disciplinary administrative proceedings, constitute punishment of a 6 GE.18-22078 Manzano et al. v. Colombia (CCPR/C/98/D/1616/2007), para. 6.4, and L.D.L.P. v. Spain (CCPR/C/102/D/1622/2007), para. 6.3. 11