CCPR/C/123/D/2537/2015 review by a second instance is not absolute, since this right is not one of the core elements of the right to due process. Exceptions may be made to this principle provided that they are reasonable and proportional and respect the right to equality and substantive due process.3 4.5 Neither the Covenant nor any other human rights treaties establish a requirement for a second hearing in criminal proceedings for high-ranking officials with parliamentary immunity. States parties enjoy a wide margin of discretion in shaping procedures and designing effective mechanisms for the protection of rights and there is no absolute requirement for a second criminal hearing in trials involving high-ranking officials. The trial of such officials by the highest body in criminal matters is in itself a full guarantee of due process. The State party maintains that an unequivocal requirement for a “second instance” cannot be deduced from the wording of article 14 (5) of the Covenant since the wording actually used in the text is a “higher tribunal”. The reference to a “higher tribunal” can be interpreted as meaning that the case must be heard by a court endowed with higher academic and professional qualities in order to ensure a correct evaluation of the issues before it. 4.6 In the author’s case, on 17 July 2014, the Criminal Chamber, as sole instance, convicted him of offences of embezzlement for third parties’ benefit and entering into contracts without meeting the legal requirements. The criminal proceedings were not politically motivated. In its indictment, the Attorney General’s Office affirmed that the author, as Minister of Agriculture, had failed to conform to the principles and standards that govern contractual agreements entered into by the State when preparing and formalizing three agreements with the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture within the framework of which funds were illegally disbursed to private individuals, causing a depletion of State assets. The Supreme Court’s judgment was limited to establishing whether or not the author was criminally liable; it did not consider the purpose or significance of the AIS programme. 4.7 During the trial before the Supreme Court, all fundamental safeguards enjoyed by the author, as a defendant, were respected. For example, in order to guarantee his right to a defence, on 16 May 2012, the Criminal Chamber annulled the order implemented immediately after the pretrial hearing and set the date of the oral proceedings for 14 June 2012. At the indictment hearing, on 12 October 2011, two Supreme Court judges, including the lead judge, sought to recuse themselves from the decision as to the point of the trial from which the number of representative of the victims should be restricted in order to bring the size of the prosecution team into line with the size of the defence team. The recusal request was based on the fact that the two judges had petitioned for amparo against a decision adopted by the Criminal Chamber in a trial against two public officials working for the office of the President who were accused of illegal surveillance and wiretapping of various persons, including Supreme Court judges, in which they had been recognized as victims. However, the Criminal Chamber refused the recusal request, finding that there was no direct or indirect correlation between this earlier decision and the case against the author to be decided by the two judges, among others. Furthermore, during the proceedings the author made no reference to the possibility that there may be grounds for the judges’ recusal. 4.8 The conviction and sentence handed down against the author did not constitute a violation of the non bis in idem principle. Although the author was subject to tax-related, disciplinary and criminal investigations for conduct related to the administration of the AIS programme, the purpose, aim and scope of these investigations differed from those of the criminal proceedings. In addition, the facts were not exactly the same. 4.9 The sentence handed down against the author by the Supreme Court is not disproportionate, and reflects the application not of discretionary criteria but of the legally established guidelines for determining individual criminal liability, as detailed by the Supreme Court in its judgment. The other persons facing criminal charges, who received more lenient sentences, were rewarded for having cooperated with the judicial authorities 3 6 The State party refers to Constitutional Court rulings C-142 of 1993, C-591 of 1996, C-545 of 2008, C-650 of 2001 and C-254A of 2012. GE.18-22078