CCPR/C/123/D/2537/2015 legal requirements. Since the author was convicted of offences involving State assets, the Supreme Court also ordered that he should be barred from holding public office. The State party’s observations do not refute the lifelong character of the ban. Rather, they maintain that such a restriction was imposed by the Supreme Court in fair judicial proceedings and that this measure is legal, objective, reasonable and proportional (para. 9.2). The Committee also observes that the Supreme Court ordered that the author’s civil rights be restricted for the same duration as the main sentence (17 years and 5 months), and that the author has not contested this measure. Against this backdrop, the Committee must determine whether the lifelong suspension of the author’s rights under article 25, which continues to apply after the main sentence has been served, is compatible with the Covenant. The Committee considers that States parties pursue a legitimate aim in combating acts of corruption and protecting the treasury, and therefore the public interest, for the purpose of preserving the democratic order. Thus, a State party may have a legitimate interest in restricting the access of persons convicted of crimes of corruption to public office. To this end, the State party may impose a lifelong suspension of the rights protected under article 25 of the Covenant only in the most exceptional cases, for serious crimes and when justified by the individual circumstances of the convicted person. Any such ban must be based on objective grounds and be foreseeable.13 In this case, the Committee observes that the author was found guilty of the serious crimes committed by him in the exercise of his functions as Minister of Agriculture, the highest public official of the ministry in question, and that such crimes significantly affected the State’s assets. Having established the criminal liability of the author, the Supreme Court automatically imposed a lifelong suspension of his rights under article 25 of the Covenant, in accordance with article 122 of the Constitution, as amended by Legislative Act No. 01 of 2004, which was in force at the time of the events in question (see footnote 1 above). The duration of this ban considerably exceeds that of the main sentence imposed on the author. The Committee observes that the ban provided for in article 122 of the Constitution is described in vague terms and is not subject to any time limit, and that the conditions for imposing such a ban are likewise referred to in such terms, thereby limiting their foreseeability. Moreover, in the light of the information made available to the Committee by the parties, the Committee observes that the Supreme Court did not conduct a meaningful individualized assessment of the proportionality of the restriction of the author’s rights under article 25 of the Covenant. In the operative part of its judgment, which imposed the ban in question, the Court did not explicitly consider the specific circumstances of the serious crimes of which the author had been convicted. The Court likewise failed to sufficiently explain how the specific circumstances of the case justified the imposition of a lifelong suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Committee finds that the available information does not enable it to conclude that, in this case, the lifelong restrictions imposed on the author’s rights under article 25 of the Covenant by the Supreme Court were proportional. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that the State party violated the author’s rights under article 25 of the Covenant. 12. The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of articles 14 (5) and 25 of the Covenant. 13. In accordance with article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy. This requires that full reparation be made to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. The Committee considers that, in the present case, its Views on the merits of the complaint constitute sufficient reparation for the violation found. The State party is also under an obligation to take all necessary steps to prevent the occurrence of similar violations in the future, including a review of its legislation to ensure that any restriction of the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs and to be elected is reasonable and proportional and is based on an individualized assessment of each case. 14. Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether or not there has been a violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State 13 14 Paksas v. Lithuania (CCPR/C/110/D/2155/2012), para. 8.4. GE.18-22078