traditions and expression of views on the one hand, no matter how extremist these may be perceived to be, and the aggressive and violent manifestation of those views on the 154 other hand. Moreover, for a number of reasons, indicators raise practical problems and have limited reliability. It cannot be assumed that an individual is violently radicalized on the sole basis of a limited set of indicators without regard to broader contextual and case-specific considerations (the path to VERLT and the combination of push and pull factors are 155 unique in each case). In the absence of any determining feature of VERLT, it is particularly difficult, if not impossible, to predict with a high degree of probability whether an individual will support a cause with violent means. Some may spot signs of radicalization leading to terrorism or violence in the change of a prisoner’s behaviour or day-to-day habits, while these may, for example, only be “external or behavioural markers of enhanced religious 156 practice” or of alignment to certain political or other ideologies. This lack of reliability is further exacerbated when indicators are based on discriminatory assumptions and stereotypes about the profile of individuals considered “vulnerable” to VERLT. Leaders and recruiters may also be circumventing indicators and profiles by conforming – at least superficially – to the prison regime or by displaying attitudes or behaviours that do not raise any suspicions. Common indicators also often disregard the specificities of violent radicalization of gender- and age-specific actors. Proper identification of VERLT in prisons requires tools that are individualized and tailored to specific categories of prisoners. Finally, relying on simplistic indicators may also have counterproductive effects. It may alienate and stigmatize particular prisoners or groups of prisoners, thus creating or feeding into feelings of frustration and humiliation that form a breeding ground for VERLT. These frustrations can be exploited for propaganda and recruitment purposes both inside and outside prisons. If prison staff rely too heavily on a limited set of indicators, as opposed to other observations they may have and input from other staff, for example, this can lead to preconceptions or misconceptions about the real risk an individual poses. Ultimately, such a scenario may jeopardize the day-to-day contact between prison staff and prisoners, and efforts to build trust based on the dynamic security approach. It is crucial to ensure that indicators or any similar tools based on indicators used do not discriminate against particular prisoners or groups of prisoners and do not unnecessarily or disproportionally interfere with prisoners’ rights. Freedom of religion or belief: Indicators used to detect radicalization leading to terrorism or violence in prison sometimes focus on religious conversion and prisoners’ manifestation of their religious beliefs. Indicators have been said to include, for instance, physical and conspicuous religious signs, a sudden interest in religion, a desire to convert fellow prisoners, the expression of support for radical extremist causes or leaders, and 154 Council of Europe, “Council of Europe Handbook”, op. cit., note 2, Chapter Two, para. 38. 155 Council of Europe, “Guidelines for Prison and Probation Services regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism”, op. cit., note 56, Guideline 32. 156 Council of Europe CDPC PC-CP, “Commentary by Francesco Ragazzi, Scientific Expert, to the Guidelines for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalization and Violent Extremism”, 2 December 2015, p. 10. 38