Instruments of restraint, use of force and transfers Levels of violence in prisons are increasing globally, often due to overcrowding, to the excessive use of solitary confinement, leading to mental and physical damage, and to other 277 institutional problems. As is the case with other groups of detainees, some detainees engaged in VERLT may present high security risks for other prisoners and for prison staff. This is demonstrated by reported cases of violent clashes between staff members 278 and prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offences. In order to maintain order and 279 security, prison staff may have to resort to force or physical means of restraint. Force must only be used as a measure of last resort, however, in accordance with the principles 280 of legality, necessity and proportionality. The UN Nelson Mandela Rules stipulate that the use of instruments of restraint must be authorized by law and applied in exceptional circumstances only, as a measure of last resort when other methods have failed to either prevent an escape during transfer or to prevent a prisoner from injuring themselves or others or to prevent them from damaging property. The least intrusive method of restraint should be used, only for the time period required, and should be removed as soon as the risk ceases. Restraints should never 281 be used as a disciplinary measure. On children, restraints can only be used in strictly 282 exceptional, specified cases only, and their use is forbidden on women during labour, 283 during birth and immediately after birth. Instruments of restraint that are “inherently degrading or painful”, such as chains and irons, are explicitly prohibited under international 277 PRI & Thailand Institute of Justice, Global Prison Trends 2020, (London: PRI, 2020), p. 35: The UN reported in 2019 that violent, excessive and illegal use of force by officials is one of the main causes of serious injury and death in situations of deprivation of liberty. Across the OSCE region since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been hunger strikes and prison protests or riots as expressions of anger against the suspension of visits (and conditions of detention). In some contexts, the suppression of riots has resulted in alleged excessive use of force by law enforcement officials, the use of solitary confinement as a punishment and accusations of torture or ill-treatment. See: ODIHR, OSCE Human Dimension Commitments and State Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic, op. cit., note 27o, pp. 102-103. 278 For example, three attacks against prison guards by prisoners convicted for terrorism-related offences took place in different French prisons in January 2018, see: Aurelien Breeden, “Striking French Prison Guards, Sand Firm, Citing Safety and Pay”, Nytimes.com, 22 January 2018; Basra and Neumann, Prisons and Terrorism: Extremist Offender Management in 10 European Countries, op. cit., note 51, pp. 15-22. JeanBaptiste Jacquin and Elise Vincent, “Prison de Condé-sur-Sarthe : le détenu qui a blessé deux surveillants maîtrisé par le RAID, sa femme tuée”, Le Monde, 5 May 2019; “Dozens killed in riot at Tajikistan prison holding Isis militants”, The Guardian, 20 May 2019 ; “At Least 50 Inmates Were Killed In Tajik Prison Riot, Sources Say”, RFERL, 13 November 2018. 279 For a comprehensive analysis of relevant standards, see ODIHR & PRI, Guidance Document on the Nelson Mandela Rules, op. cit., note 10, Chapter 3, paras. 02-40. See also, PRI and APT, “Detention Monitoring Tool –Addressing Risk Factors to Prevent Torture and Ill-Treatment”, 2013. 280 Its use is only justified in exceptional circumstances “when strictly necessary for the maintenance of security and order within the institution, or when personal safety is threatened.” UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990, Principle 15, see ODIHR & PRI, Guidance Document on the Nelson Mandela Rules, op. cit., note 10, Chapter 3, para. 41-67. 281 UN Nelson Mandela Rules, op. cit., note 13, Rule 43.2. 282 UN Havana Rules, op. cit., note 86, Rule 64. 283 UN Nelson Mandela Rules, op. cit., note 13, Rule 48.2; UN Bangkok Rules, op. cit., note 79, Rule 24. 62