CCPR/C/116/D/2411/2014 substantiated for purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, the Committee declares that part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.7 The Committee notes that the author has not provided any details concerning the alleged violation of his rights under articles 14 (3) (b) and (g) of the Covenant and finds this part of the claim insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.8 Concerning the author’s claim that his rights under article 14 (3) (d) were violated because he was sentenced for giving false testimony, whereas under article 51 of the Constitution a person who gives false testimony when interrogated as a witness in a crime cannot be held liable for giving such testimony if he or she participated in the crime in question. The Committee notes that, on 19 November 2008, the Supreme Court repealed the author’s sentence under article 307 (2) of the Criminal Code. Given these circumstances, the Committee concludes that the author cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of article 14 (3) (d). This part of the communication is therefore inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol. 6.9 As to the author’s remaining claim under article 15 (1) of the Covenant regarding the qualification by the courts of his acts as terrorism, the Committee notes the argument by the State party that the national courts applied article 205 of the old Criminal Code since it provided for a lighter penalty compared to that which would have applied under the new version of the article. The Committee takes notes of Supreme Court resolution No. 1 and observes that the State party’s courts should have revised the author’s sentence retroactively in accordance with the guidance set out in the resolution. The Committee notes, however, that since it is up to the national courts to qualify the actions of the author under the law, it is unknown whether the penalty that could have been applied to the author after the revision of his sentence in accordance with the resolution No. 1 would have been lighter than that applied to him under article 205 of the old Criminal Code, which was in force when the crimes were committed. In that light, the Committee considers that the author failed to substantiate sufficiently his claim that his rights under article 15 (1) of the Covenant were violated. The Committee thus finds this part of the complaint inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.10 As regards the allegations of the author that the court of supervisory instance worsened his situation by increasing the prison term compared with the term imposed by the court of first instance, the Committee notes that this part of the claim raises issues under article 14 (1) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that “the concept of a fair hearing in the context of article 14 (1) of the Covenant should be interpreted as requiring a number of conditions, such as equality of arms, respect for the principle of adversary proceedings, preclusion of ex officio reformatio in pejus and expeditious procedure. The facts of the case should accordingly be tested against those criteria.”6 The Committee notes that this claim concerns interpretation of national legislation and the method applied for calculating the sentence in case of multiple charges. The Committee also notes the submission of the author that the Court repealed the author’s sentence under article 307 (2) of the Criminal Code and at the same time increased the prison term originally set by the court of first instance under articles 306 (3), 167 (2) and 222 (1) of the Code and thus imposed a more severe penalty. The Committee notes, however, that in principle it is up to the courts of States parties to interpret domestic legislation, unless it is clearly arbitrary or amounts to a denial of justice. From the materials on the file, the Committee cannot conclude that the calculation of the prison term by the Supreme Court was arbitrary or the result of the improper application of the law or that it amounted to a denial of justice. The Committee 6 8 See communication No. 207/1986, Yves Morael v. France, Views adopted on 28 July 1989.