CAT/C/DEU/CO/6 38. While taking note of the increase in the number of Länder that have obliged police officers to wear identification badges showing either their number or their name while on duty, the Committee reiterates its concern, as expressed in its previous concluding observations (CAT/C/DEU/CO/5, para. 30), that the Federal Government has not introduced an individual identification requirement for all police officers, given that the lack of identification can hinder the investigation and holding to account of the police officers allegedly implicated in ill-treatment (arts. 12, 13 and 14). 39. The State party is encouraged to establish, at the federal and Länder levels, independent bodies to investigate all complaints of police misconduct, and ensure that such complaints are promptly and thoroughly investigated. 40. The State party should ensure that members of the police force in all Länder can be effectively identified at all times when carrying out their law enforcement duties and held accountable when implicated in ill-treatment. Counter-terrorism and national security 41. The Committee is seriously concerned by the State party’s increasing reliance on “pre-emptive justice”, which circumvents regular criminal judicial procedures to grant wide-reaching powers to the police, including as regards “potential attackers”, who are defined as persons who could take part in crimes of terrorism in the future. In this regard, the Committee is concerned by the following developments: (a) The amended Federal Criminal Police Office Act, which was passed by the Federal Parliament in April 2017, which authorizes the Federal Criminal Police Office to include electronic tagging and surveillance of “potential attackers”; (b) The adoption of an increased time frame for administrative detention of potential attackers from 14 days to 3 months in the Land of Bavaria; (c) The process of simplified detention pending deportation for persons “representing a significant security threat”, which is contained in a law on improved enforcement of expulsion orders, passed by the Federal Parliament in May 2017. 42. The Committee recalls its concern in its previous concluding observations (CAT/C/DEU/CO/5, para. 26) on the parliamentary inquiry into alleged involvement of the State party in extraordinary renditions and secret detention of terrorist suspects and the June 2009 ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court that the Government’s failure to fully cooperate with the inquiry was a violation of the Constitution, and regrets the lack of clarity on whether the State party has taken any steps to follow up on this matter. 43. The Committee regrets the lack of information provided on the Act for ForeignForeign Signals Intelligence Gathering of the Federal Intelligence Service, adopted by the Parliament on 21 October 2016, which expands the powers of the Federal Intelligence Service by authorizing the monitoring of communications of foreign nationals abroad for the purpose of obtaining information of significance for the State party’s foreign policy and security. 44. The Committee is gravely concerned that the State party enables counter-terrorism measures that violate human rights to be committed from its territory, in particular the transmittal of electronic signals through facilities at Ramstein airbase, which allow unmanned aerial vehicles of a foreign power to conduct operations in third countries, including targeted killings outside of the context of armed conflict (arts. 11 and 16). 45. The State party should ensure that: (a) Monitoring and detention of individuals suspected of terrorism is based only a prior, individualized risk assessment that is subject to regular review; (b) Individual assessments are based on specific and objective criteria, including a person’s actual behaviour, and supported by credible, concrete, complete and up-to-date information. In addition, it should determine whether placement in detention is necessary and proportionate, as required by its obligations under international law and standards; 8