A/HRC/13/39/Add.5 person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. […].” At least four essential elements find their reflection in this definition. First, an act inflicting severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental; second, the element of intent; thirdly, the specific purpose; and fourthly, the involvement of a State official, at least by acquiescence. Taken together, these elements contribute to a comprehensive concept of torture, as distinguished from other forms of CIDT. (a) Act 31. The term “act” is not to be understood in any way as to exclude omissions. An examination of the traveaux préparatoires of the Convention does not reveal any indication whatsoever that the drafters would have intended e.g. to exclude from the definition of torture the intentional deprivation of a detainee of his or her food for a certain purpose leading to severe pain. It is well established by numerous decisions by the UN Committee against Torture and other relevant monitoring bodies10 that torture can be committed by omission. (b) Severe pain or suffering 32. Only acts which cause severe pain or suffering can qualify as torture, as stipulated in the UN Convention against Torture which draws on to the earlier wording of the UN Declaration against Torture. The intensity of the pain and suffering distinguishes torture from degrading treatment, as elaborated in an earlier report to the Council, but not from cruel and inhuman treatment. The severity does not have to be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure or impairment of bodily functions or even death, as suggested in the “torture memos” under the Bush administration in the United States.11 33. The term “torture” should not be used in an inflationary manner. It is reserved for one of the worst possible human rights violations and abuses human beings can inflict upon each other, and therefore carries a “special stigma”. At the same time this means that once it is established that torture has been inflicted, one is dealing with a very serious crime and an ill-treatment of human beings who will most likely suffer from its consequences for the rest of their lives, if not physically then mentally. (c) Intent 34. The element of intent contained in the definition of torture in the Convention requires that severe pain or suffering be intentionally inflicted on the victim in order to achieve a certain purpose. From this follows that torture can never be inflicted by negligence. A detainee who is forgotten by the prison officials and suffers from severe pain due to the lack of food is without doubt the victim of a severe human rights violation. However, this treatment does not amount to torture given the lack of intent by the authorities. On the other hand, if the detainee is deprived of food for the purpose of extracting certain information, that ordeal, in accordance with article 1, would qualify as 10 11 ECHR, Greek Case, 12 YB 1, 1969. E/CN.4/2006/6. See also Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, The UN Convention against Torture – A Commentary, OUP, 2008. See also Manfred Nowak, What Practices Constitute Torture: US and UN Standards, 28 Human Rights Quarterly 809, 2006. 13