CAT/C/60/D/465/2011 violating human dignity. Furthermore, the State party has not explained the possibility for seeking suspension under Finnish law and how, in practice, it could have been applied in the complainant’s case, particularly in the light of the assessment by the domestic authorities that the risk that he would be subjected to torture upon return to the Russian Federation was not established. The Committee further notes the complainant’s contention that an application for leave to appeal should be submitted in Finnish, which he does not speak; that he did not benefit from legal assistance to prepare it within a very limited time before the deportation; and that, in any event, leave to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court is granted only if new circumstances emerge in a case, which did not exist in his case at the relevant time. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that the complainant’s failure to apply for leave to appeal before the Supreme Administrative Court does not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the complaint. 8.4 As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the communication submitted under article 3 of the Convention admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 9.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 9.2 With regard to the complainant’s claim under article 3 of the Convention, the Committee must determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture should he be returned to the Russian Federation. In assessing this risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. 5 It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not, as such, constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 9.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) in the context of article 22 (refoulement and communications), according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable, the Committee notes that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk. 6 The Committee further recalls that, in accordance with its general comment No. 1 (1997), it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, 7 while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22 (4) of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 9.4 The Committee takes note of the claim that the complainant was arrested and illtreated by the police in St. Petersburg in July 2007, which, according to him, resulted in a fractured shoulder and a dislocated finger. It notes that the complainant underwent surgery twice in this connection and submitted medical evidence. It also notes the complainant’s contention that the police mistreatment is explained by his participation in the opposition 5 6 7 See, inter alia, communication No. 470/2011, X. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 24 November 2014, para. 7.2. See, inter alia, communications No. 203/2002, A.R. v. Netherlands, decision adopted on 14 November 2003 and No. 258/2004, Dadar v. Canada, decision adopted on 23 November 2005. See, inter alia, communication No. 356/2008, N.S. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 6 May 2010, para. 7.3. 7