A common misconception of the right to life is that the positive duty to protect the right to life of the general public justifies the introduction of extreme measures that may violate other rights, including the right to life of those suspected of terrorism. This is not the case. The obligation to guarantee life requires that all measures that are designed to protect it, especially where this involves the use of lethal force, are focused, targeted and exceptional. Use of lethal force by law enforcement and in armed conflict The right to life does recognize certain strictly regulated categories of permissible deprivation. These are dealt with below in detail. It is essential that law-enforcement agencies understand the limited circumstances where it could be lawful to use lethal force. These can be summarized as:240 • • • • defence of any person from unlawful violence; arrest; the prevention of escape; and the quashing of an insurrection or riot. These justifications for the use of lethal force are explicitly recognized in the ECHR and are commonly accepted under national laws. However, these justifications are subject to the test of absolute necessity, which amounts to a very high-threshold proportionality test. Therefore, simply because someone is resisting arrest, even for a serious offence, resorting to the use of lethal force is not permissible without the further justification for its use that the individual concerned is also about to use comparable force against others. This principle would apply equally to those involved in a riot. Permissible deprivations may also be governed by subsidiary rules such as the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. The right to life, therefore, clearly imposes a negative obligation on the state to refrain from taking life. Any death caused by an agent of the state using force beyond that which is absolutely necessary or for a reason other than those identified above will amount to a violation of the right to life and will be unlawful. In the context of counter-terrorism, understanding when it is lawful to use lethal force is essential. The responsibility under the right to life is not limited to this negative obligation. The HRC has also interpreted the right to life as creating positive obligations on the state. It has maintained that, “the inherent right to life cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures.”241 The HRC suggested that positive measures might include steps to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially through the elimination of malnutrition and epidemics. Those positive obligations do not include the adoption of draconian measures to protect life under all circumstances. The obligation to protect life imposes a duty to adopt reasonable measures to ensure that the right to life can be guaranteed.242 The right to life should be understood as creating two obligations; a substantive obligation in relation to the guarantee of life itself, and a procedural obligation where there has been a loss of life. The HRC has also addressed the relationship between the right to life and armed con240 These were accepted by the HRC in the Guerrero case, ibid. 241 Op. cit., note 237, HRC, General Comment No. 6, para. 4. 242 Op. cit., note 28, ECtHR, Osman v. UK, paras. 115-121. Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights 99