Even during an emergency that threatens the life of the nation, enforced disappearances can never be justified, because they deny the detainee any form of procedural safeguard and are likely to result in death and/or torture. For a loss of liberty to fall within the definition of an enforced disappearance, the perpetrator must have been aware that the arrest, detention or abduction would remain unacknowledged, or that information would be refused about the whereabouts or fate of the person concerned. The perpetrator must have intended to remove that person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Where an individual has disappeared after being taken into custody and there is no concrete evidence that agents of the state have killed the individual, a violation of the right to life may not have occurred.263 However, in the event of such a disappearance, the disappeared person’s next of kin will have standing under the right to life to require that the disappearance be investigated. Protection from inhuman and degrading treatment will also be relevant. The rights of victims’ families are particularly important, including the right to be informed of the whereabouts of the disappeared if it is known to authorities.264 Extra-judicial executions The targeting and elimination of known or suspected terrorists undermines the right to life. In addition, it may be counter-productive as it places no obligation upon the state to demonstrate that those against whom lethal force was used were, indeed, terrorists or to demonstrate that every other alternative had been exhausted. The practice may, therefore, undermine the credibility of the state’s counter-terrorism policy. Furthermore, the acceptance of extra-judicial and arbitrary executions creates the potential for an endless expansion of the relevant categories within it to include any other enemies of the state, social misfits, political opponents, or others.265 The HRC has expressed concern with respect to the alleged use of so-called “targeted killings” of suspected terrorists. The Committee has emphasized that states parties, “should not use ‘targeted killings’ as a deterrent or punishment. The State party should ensure that the utmost consideration is given to the principle of proportionality in all its responses to terrorist threats and activities […] Before resorting to the use of deadly force, all measures to arrest a person suspected of being in the process of committing acts of terror must be exhausted.”266 263 ECtHR, Kurt v. Turkey, Case no. 15/1997/799/1002, 25 May 1998, paras. 100-109. 264 ECtHR, Cyprus v Turkey, Application no. 25781/94, 10 May 2001, para. 157 (“The silence of the authorities of the respondent State in the face of the real concerns of the relatives of the missing persons attains a level of severity which can only be categorised as inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3”). 265 “[I]t is increasingly common to read arguments along the lines that ‘targeting and eliminating known terrorists is more efficient and costs fewer lives than waging conventional war’ [quote]. While there are a great many empirical arguments that might be made in order to show that such strategies will be counterproductive, the point is that such proposals directly undermine the essential foundations of human rights law. Empowering Governments to identify and kill ‘known terrorists’ places no verifiable obligation upon them to demonstrate in any way that those against whom lethal force is used are indeed terrorists, or to demonstrate that every other alternative had been exhausted […] And it makes a mockery of whatever accountability mechanisms may have otherwise constrained or exposed such illegal action under either humanitarian or human rights law”, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, doc. E/CN.4/2005/7, 22 December 2004, para. 41. 266 Op. cit., note 131, HRC, Concluding observations: Israel, para. 15. Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights 105