custody, possibly indefinitely, or to be interrogated with the hope that that the interrogation abroad will yield more information than the methods that could be used at home. The last two scenarios involve, at best, legal avoidance: suspects will be transferred because what will be done to them abroad could not legally be done at home. I fail to see any justification for any state to be a party to such practice. If they are transferred to face trial, prudence would dictate that their transfer should not be tainted with illegality since in many countries this could lead to the courts declining to exercise jurisdiction. If they are transferred to countries where very few due process requirements are likely to stand in the way of prolonged detention, illegal interrogations or unfair trials, then we should be clear about our endorsement of such double standards: we are not willing, or not able, to dilute our domestic legal protections in the name or counter-terrorism, but we will happily have resort to the methods used by others that we otherwise overtly denounce and deplore.405 These views have been echoed throughout international human rights organizations such as the Council of Europe and elsewhere at the UN. The Special Rapporteur on Torture has expressed his concern that the practice of seeking diplomatic assurances for the purpose of expelling or returning persons, in spite of a risk of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, reflects a tendency in Europe to circumvent the internationally recognized principle of non-refoulement. He has warned that diplomatic assurances are not an appropriate tool to eradicate the risk of torture and other ill-treatment by the receiving country.406 The issues raised by the use of “diplomatic assurances” were also considered by the Council of Europe. Its Steering Committee for Human Rights recommended that the Council should not embark in the drafting of a legal instrument on minimum conditions/standards required when using such practices, so as not to support the principle of diplomatic assurances themselves in this sensitive context.407 On numerous occasions, the Human Rights Committee has emphasized its position in relation to refoulement. For example, the Committee has stressed that it was, “concerned about the formulation of the draft law on the legal status of foreigners, which […] may allow for the removal of foreigners who are regarded as a threat to State security, despite the fact that they may be exposed to a violation of their rights under [ICCPR] Article 7 in the country of return.” 408 The Committee has also emphasized that Security Council Resolution 1373 does not give permission to violate human rights. It has pointed out that, “the State Party is requested to ensure that counter-terrorism measures, whether taken in connection with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) or otherwise, are in full conformity with the Covenant. In particular, it should ensure absolute protection for all individuals, without exception, against refoulement to countries where they risk violation of their rights under article 7.” 409 405 Op. cit., note 403, L. Arbour, In Our Name, pp. 19-20. 406 See for instance Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak, doc. A/60/316, 30 August 2005, paras. 45-46. 407 Meeting Report CDDH(2006)007. At the 963rd meeting of Ministers’ Deputies on 3 May 2006, the Committee of Ministers took note of the report of the Steering Committee. 408 HRC, Concluding Observations: Lithuania, doc. CCPR/CO/80/LTU, 4 May 2004, para. 7. 409 Ibid. See also op. cit., note 386, HRC, Concluding observations: Yemen (2002), para. 18; op. cit., note 342, CAT, Concluding observations: Yemen, para. 5. For a recent opinion of the HRC on violations of Art. 13 ICCPR in connection with terrorism and expulsion proceedings, see HRC, Ahani v. Canada, Communication No. 1051/2002, doc. CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002, 15 June 2004. Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights 141