CAT/C/55/D/555/2013 be necessary in cases in which an asylum seeker has appeared not credible throughout the proceedings and the Board rejects the asylum seeker’s statement about torture in its entirety.6 The State party considers that there was no need in the present case to conduct such an examination because the Refugee Appeals Board found that no torture had occurred, as a result of its determination that the complainant’s statements concerning a series of crucial issues were not credible, as indicated in paragraphs 4.4 to 4.8 above. The fact that the complainant has three fingers missing cannot in itself make it necessary to conduct an examination for signs of torture. As to the complainant’s credibility regarding the significance of medical information, the State party relies on the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden,7 and to the Committee’s decision in M.O. v. Denmark,8 and asserts that in those cases, the complainants’ claims of torture were dismissed owing to a general lack of credibility. 4.10 Concerning the complainant’s claim that he had no access to an appeal or an oral hearing before the Refugee Appeals Board, the State party observes that the decision of the Danish Immigration Service to deny his asylum application was appealed and the appeal processed by the Refugee Appeals Board in accordance with the rules applicable to the procedure for manifestly unfounded cases. Under this procedure, established in the Aliens Act, the Danish Immigration Service may determine upon submission to the Danish Refugee Council that a negative decision on an asylum application that is manifestly unfounded may not be appealed before the Refugee Appeals Board. The Aliens Act provides a non-exhaustive description of the circumstances in which that procedure should apply, including cases in which the factual circumstances invoked are manifestly irrelevant to asylum, or cases involving factual circumstances that cannot constitute the basis for asylum under the Board’s case law. The procedure may also be used in cases in which the statement given is manifestly not credible. If the Danish Refugee Council does not concur in the assessment of the application as manifestly unfounded, the case will be considered by a chairman or deputy chairman of the Refugee Appeals Board, unless there is a reason to assume that the Board will alter the decision of the Danish Immigration Service. Such cases are considered on the basis of written evidence, but may be assigned to oral proceedings, depending on the circumstances.9 The Refugee Appeals Board assigns counsel to the asylum seeker in cases processed under that procedure. Counsel receives a copy of the case file and may meet with the asylum seeker. Counsel then submits his observations on the case in writing to the Refugee Appeals Board. The State party considers that, given that the complainant’s claim was correctly processed in accordance with the laws applicable to the procedure for manifestly unfounded cases, there is no reason why the complainant’s appeal should now be heard at an oral Board hearing. 4.11 The State party considers that the complainant is attempting to use the Committee as an appellate body to have the factual circumstances of his asylum claim reassessed. As indicated in the Committee’s general comment No. 1 (1998) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, the Committee is not an appellate body, or a quasi-judicial or an administrative body, but rather a monitoring body (para. 9). Therefore, the Committee should give considerable weight to findings of fact made by the authorities of the State party, in the present case, the Refugee Appeals Board. In the present 6 7 8 9 The State party also provides extensive background information on the asylum process in Denmark and the operating procedures of the Refugee Appeals Board. See Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, European Court of Human Rights, application No. 15576/89, judgement of 20 March 1999, paras. 77-82. See communication No. 209/2002, M.O. v. Denmark, decision adopted on 12 November 2003, paras. 6.4-6.6. The State party refers to sections 56 (3) and 56 (5) of the Danish Aliens Act. 7