CAT/C/55/D/555/2013 ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention, that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.2 The Committee recalls that, in accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, it shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that in the present case the State party does not contest that the complainant has exhausted all available domestic remedies. 6.3 The Committee recalls that for a claim to be admissible under article 22 of the Convention and rule 113 (b) of its rules of procedure, it must rise to the basic level of substantiation required for purposes of admissibility.10 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the communication is manifestly ill-founded owing to a lack of substantiation. The Committee considers, however, that the arguments put forward by the complainant raise substantive issues under article 3 of the Convention, and that those arguments should be dealt with on the merits. Accordingly, the Committee finds no obstacles to the admissibility and declares the communication admissible. Consideration of the merits 7.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all information made available to it by the parties concerned. 7.2 With regard to the complainant’s claim under article 3 of the Convention, the Committee must determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, should he be returned to China. In assessing this risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such a determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.11 7.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being “highly probable”, the Committee notes that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk. 12 The Committee recalls that in accordance with its general comment No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact 10 11 12 See, inter alia, communication No. 308/2006, K.A. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 16 November 2007, para. 7.2. See, inter alia, communication No. 470/2011, X. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 24 November 2014. See, inter alia, communications No. 203/2002, A.R. v. Netherlands, decision adopted on 14 November 2003 and No. 258/2004, Dadar v. Canada, decision adopted on 23 November 2005. 9