Ability to receive complaints from parties not directly affected – NHRIs should be able to receive complaints or petitions from a broad range of parties, ­including complainants who are not directly affected. Recognising that some people may find it difficult (or be reluctant) to lodge complaints with an official body, civil society organisations should be permitted to make complaints on their behalf, provided they have received prior consent from the direct victims or their representatives. Power to act on individual or collective issues at their own initiative (suo motu) – NHRIs should always have authority to take up individual or collective issues at their own initiative, without a complaint having been lodged. Responding in a timely manner to complaints – Internal procedures should ­establish deadlines for dealing with complaints and for informing the parties of the status of the complaint. In particular, authorities against whom complaints are made should be required to make an initial response within a certain time. This said, the objective is to investigate complaints thoroughly, and evidence that cases have been dealt with quickly should be given less prominence than evidence of satisfactory resolution. Investigation of serious violations should not be time-limited – NHRIs should not be prevented from investigating serious human rights violations by time ­limits (statutes of limitation). Fear, psychological trauma or difficulty in ­gathering ­supporting evidence may delay the lodging of such complaints. Passage of time should not allow those responsible to escape accountability or those ­affected to lose the right to obtain redress. Employing staff with professional investigation skills – Skilled professionals (from forensic doctors to ballistic experts) may be needed to conduct some investigations. Conflicts of interest may arise if the latter are linked institutionally to public services. For example, police investigators should not be recruited on secondment to investigate police misconduct. Recruitment of such experts often presents problems and national institutions should be authorised to bring experts from outside the country where this is necessary. Power to compel witnesses to testify, require presentation of evidence and conduct on-site investigations – NHRIs should have legal authority to compel the appearance of witnesses and presentation of evidence as well as obtain ­access to premises. This is a crucial advantage that an official human rights body has over a non-governmental one. This said, procedures should take ­account of the legal rights of those who might be affected by legal proceedings relating to the same case. Power to protect witnesses – NHRIs should have the power to organise ­secure witness protection programmes. They should be able to recommend ­suspension from duty of officials under investigation for human rights violations. This then ensures that the latter have no power over witnesses or complainants. This would be without prejudice to the investigation. Power to compel authorities to respond to their recommendations – NHRIs usually have no direct power to enforce their recommendations. To have such power is generally regarded as being contrary to justice, because NHRIs Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions 21