law enforcement objective. When the use of force is reasonably necessary28 only the minimum force
required to achieve that objective shall be used and must cease as soon as it is no longer necessary.29
Proportionality30 means that law enforcement officials should consider both the type and the level of
the force to be used, when necessary, and the harm that may reasonably be expected to result from
it. Consequently, the use of force shall be proportionate to the threat posed or to the offence. The
Guidance reiterates that “[i]n no case should this provision be interpreted to authorize the use of force
used which is disproportionate to the legitimate objective to be achieved”31.
The principle of non-discrimination is directed at ensuring equal treatment of persons subject to the
use of force while exercising a heightened level of care and precaution with respect to individuals “who
are known or are likely to be especially vulnerable to the effects of a particular weapon”32.
Finally, the principle of accountability recalls the State’s obligation to ensure that law enforcement
officials, including those who gave the orders, are individually held accountable for their decisions and
actions regarding the use force. Moreover, the principle covers the State’s obligation to investigate all
alleged or suspected violations of human rights, including torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.33
15. The Guidance on Less-lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement explicitly underscores that international
human rights laws applies to the use of force, particularly laws “pertaining to the rights to life, to freedom
from torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to security of
person, and to the right of peaceful assembly”34. Furthermore, it states that breaches of the principles
of necessity and/or proportionality, which result in unnecessary or excessive use of force, may amount
to torture or ill-treatment.35 This statement echoes decisions by the European Court of Human Rights in
relation to the use of force in non-custodial settings.36
16. The Guidance further elaborates on how the inappropriate use of less-lethal weapons can lead to
breaches of the absolute prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment37, and provides a non-exhaustive
list of weapons and equipment that is “inherently degrading or unnecessarily painful”38 and whose use
would therefore contravene international human rights standards.
28. “ Given the irreversible nature of the possible consequences of the use of force, the IACHR conceives of it as “a last resort that,
qualitatively and quantitatively limited, is intended to prevent a more serious occurrence than that caused by the state’s reaction.”
Within that framework, characterized by exceptionality, both the Commission and the I/A Court HR have agreed that for the use
of force to be justified one must satisfy the principles of legality, absolute necessity, and proportionality.” See: I/A Commission on
Human Rights, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV.A, The Use of Force, March 2016, para. 7.
29. O
ffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, 2020,
paras. 2.8 and 2.9.
30. Ibid. para. 2.10.
31. 31
UN General Assembly, Code of conduct for law enforcement officials, 5 February 1980, A/RES/34/169, Commentary (b) on Article 3.
32. O
ffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, 2020, para.
2.11.
33. Ibid. paras. 3.1 to 3.13.
34. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, 2020, para. 1.4.
35. Ibid. para. 2.9.
36. E
uropean Court of Human Rights, Balçik and Others v. Turkey, 2007; European Court of Human Rights; Süleyman Çelebi and Others v.
Turkey, 2016.
European Court of Human Rights, Kılıcı v. Turkey, 2018.
37. O
ffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, 2020,
para. 7.1.5.
38. Ibid, paras. 5.1 and 5.2.
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