CAT/C/61/D/625/2014 8.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the forced removal of the complainant to Pakistan would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 8.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Pakistan. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of the evaluation is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 49 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable (para. 6), the Committee recalls that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk. 50 The Committee also recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned,51 while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22 (4) of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 8.5 In assessing the risk of torture in the present case, the Committee notes the complainant’s contention that there is a foreseeable, real and personal risk that he will be persecuted and tortured if returned to Pakistan by members of the Muslim community or by the authorities or the police owing to his Christian beliefs and activities, taking into account that he has already been harassed, threatened and attacked for those reasons. In this regard, the Committee notes the complainant’s allegations that he has received two threatening letters and that he has been attacked and beaten on at least two occasions in connection with his religious activities: first by three unknown men while he was driving his taxi in August 2011 and, second, on an unspecified date, by four police officers who took him to a police station where they beat him, hung him from the ceiling upside down and plugged water into his nose, following which they falsely accused him of illegal possession of alcohol. The Committee also notes the State party’s observation that its domestic authorities found that the complainant lacked credibility because, inter alia, when his car was stolen, he only reported the theft to the police, but he did not report the threatening letter he had received. The State party also argued that the author had given contradictory statements regarding the threatening letter dated 15 January 2010, as he initially said that it was anonymous, but he later submitted to the Board a letter signed by a religious group, and gave contradictory statements regarding how he had got this letter: he initially indicated that it was not in his possession, but after his asylum request was rejected, he offered it as evidence to the Board, indicating that he had given it to his mother who kept it and sent it to him. 49 50 51 See, for example, communications No. 550/2013, S.K. et al. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 8 May 2015, para. 7.3; and No. 716/2015, S.T. v. Australia, decision adopted on 11 May 2017. See, inter alia, communications No. 203/2002, A.R. v. Netherlands, decision adopted on 14 November 2003; and No. 258/2004, Dadar v. Canada, decision adopted on 23 November 2005. See, inter alia, communication No. 356/2008, N.S. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 6 May 2010, para. 7.3. 11