Independence of National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs) “due consideration to the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights”, the so-called Paris Principles.29 Functional independence, as prescribed in Art. 18, para. 1, constitutes a fundamental prerequisite for the effective functioning of a preventive mechanism and is indispensable to its credibility. At issue is not only de jure independence, but also de facto independence from all government bodies vested with executive powers30 who are responsible for the enforcement of measures involving deprivation of liberty in facilities inspected and monitored by the NPMs. These include, in particular, not only detention facilities and similar establishments maintained by the police or other security forces, but also all other locations where measures taken by public authorities result in de facto restrictions on the freedom of movement of individuals. The question of functional and structural independence of NPMs is thus also seen in the legal literature as a cornerstone of for their effectiveness.31 What is the meaning of functional independence in concrete terms, and how does it influence the effectiveness of an NPM? With their mandate to review the conformity of measures involving the deprivation of liberty, NPMs enter a sphere where they access information that is not publicly available, and enter into areas with a direct bearing on the monopoly on power of the government. As a new actor within domestic political power structures, they pose new challenges to the government authorities. In order for the NPMs to effectively perform their monitoring activities, a number of conditions must be fulfilled. Specifically, the govern-  Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Adopted in New York on 18 December 2002. In force in Switzerland as of 24 October 2009. English version: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat-one.pdf (Status as of 8 February 2018), https://www.admin.ch/ opc/de/classified-compilation/20060831/index.html. 30 Kälin/Nowak, p. 4. 31 Kälin/Nowak, p.4, with references to Rachel Murray/Elina Steinerte/Malcolm Evans/ Antenor Hallo de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2011, 119: “The linchpin for assessing the appropriateness of the choice of a particular institution as an NPM as well as what is seen as a factor in their effectiveness is independence”. See also, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH) and Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture: Implementation Manual, Geneva 2010, 89; Nowak/McArthur, 1075; Elina Steinerte, “The Jewel in the Crown and its Three Guardians: Independence of National Preventive Mechanisms Under the Optional Protocol to the UN Torture Convention, Human Rights Law Review 14 (2014), 6; Elina Steinerte/Rachel Murray, “Same but Different? National Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsman Institutions as National Preventive Mechanisms under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 25 (2009), 54. 29 34 Activity Report NCPT 2017