Assessing Damage, Urging Action Security Council sanctioning system). The listing process carried out by the European Union has improved following decisions of the European Court of Justice,296 but serious concerns remain regarding the transparency and accountability of the listing and de-listing process, the inter-action between domestic and EU lists, and the nature of information sharing at the EU level.297 While, the EU list is at least subject to review and renewal every six months, which should allow for an active consideration of de-listing, the Panel was informed that this process is nearly always automatic, in practice if not in principle.298 The listing process can have a dramatic impact on people’s lives, and the consequences of domestic listing are clearly multiplied when an individual or organisation is placed on an international list. The Panel received testimony about individuals who were effectively turned into “international pariahs”, with their reputations destroyed, and arguably placed in considerable danger because of the effect the listing process has had on immigration and asylum decisions.299 Nor is it necessary to rehearse again the problems likely to be created by such lists when they are maintained in large part as a result of secret intelligence: difficult as it might be for courts to assess intelligence sources in the domestic context, it is even less likely that courts will be in a position to challenge any secret information on which the Security Council sanctioning system is based. The decision to place individuals on the UN or EU listings lacks even the rudimentary safeguards that may exist at the national level. The Panel shares the concerns of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that the current procedures of listing undermine the credibility of the international fight against terrorism, and is “unworthy” of international institutions like the UN and the EU.300 These international bodies should set an exemplary role in countering terrorism in accordance with human rights and rule of law principles.301 Instead, the expanding use of listings indicates that the problem is being exacerbated not remedied. 296 Court of First Instance of the European Communities, Judgment of 12 December 2006, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v. Council of the European Union, Case T-228/02. Following the judgment, the EU Council released a statement on 29 June 2007 indicating that a statement of reasons and information about how to appeal would now be provided for parties who have their assets frozen. See, the press release by the Council of the European Union, “EU terrorist list- Adoption of new consolidated list”, 11309/07 (Press 158), 20 June 2007. 297 See for instance written submission by Prof. Christian Walter, on behalf of the German section of the ICJ, EJP European Union Hearing. 298 Oral testimony by Ben Hayes, Statewatch, EJP European Union Hearing. 299 See oral testimony by Ben Hayes, Statewatch, written submission of Belgian Comité T (EU Hearing) and oral testimony of Wolfgang Kaleck, German Republican Lawyers Association, EJP European Union Hearing. 300 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1597 (2008) adopted on 23 January 2008, para. 7; see also 2007 Marty report, Doc. 11454. 301 Various proposals have already been made to enhance due process in the UN sanctions process. See, for example, “Discussion Paper on Supplementary Guidelines for the Review of Sanctions Committees’ Listing Decisions”, Governments of Denmark, Liechtenstein, Sweden and Switzerland, November 2007. 117