44 Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on terrorism, counter-terrorism and human rights stigmatising whole groups, and even impeding the ability of the authorities to gather crucial intelligence information and to secure cooperation. An academic, credited with coining the phrase of “suspect communities” when examining the experience of Irish communities living in Britain in the early years of the IRA campaign, has written: “Good intelligence is essential to prevent acts of political violence, yet the authorities still appear to lack an understanding of the crucial role of good police community relations in this endeavour.” 69 Similar lessons have been drawn in South Asia. At its Hearing in India, a former Director of the National Police Academy, said: “…the success of counter-terrorist operations lies in how much support, how much help, you can get from the public. If there is alienation from the public, you are not going to get proper information from them. […] High handedness of security forces invariably has been found to alienate the public and hamper counter-terrorist operations.” 70 When police or military forces act, or are perceived to be acting, in a discriminatory manner, they “add fuel to an already inflammatory situation” in the words of one witness.71 The reality, or even the perception, of minority communities being targeted makes it more difficult for moderate and alternative voices in the affected communities to speak out and to be heard. A number of these issues were directly raised with the Panel, especially in relation to India, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka.72 In Sri Lanka, for example, it is widely believed that the use of the armed forces and the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and the Emergency Regulations fuelled tension at a time when political dialogue would have been arguably easier: “Tougher laws and regulations were enacted to arrest and detain persons for prolonged periods without committing to trial […]. These laws which ostensibly meant to be for the eradication of violent forms of agitation in fact helped to fuel the unrest and the existing dissatisfaction against the state. The number of persons joining rebel groups vastly increased from the sections of the people who suffered at the hands of the Sri Lankan Forces. A rag-tag group developed into a formidable and most feared military outfit, holding substantial areas of land under its control, and operating a parallel government not answerable to 69 See Paddy Hillyard, Suspect Community: People’s experiences of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain, Pluto Press, in association with the National Council for Civil Liberties, December 1993; quote taken from his written speech at the 2005 international conference held at London Metropolitan University entitled “Suspect Communities: The Real ‘War on Terror’ in Europe.” 70 Evidence given at the EJP South Asia Hearing by Senkar Sen, Institute for Social Science, former Director of the SVP National Police Academy, former Director General, National Human Rights Commission, India. 71 See EJP Belfast Hearing: oral testimony by Michael Finucane, solicitor, Executive Board Member of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties; son of Patrick Finucane (human rights lawyer murdered in Belfast in 1989). 72 See also – Peru, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, op cit., General Conclusions, No. 59: “Worse still, the strategy turned out to be counter-productive, as the indiscriminate repression in the rural areas postponed the rupture between the Shining Path and the poorer sectors of the peasantry, and failed to stop the expansion of armed forces to other areas of the country.”