84 Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on terrorism, counter-terrorism and human rights The case is a model of how transnational intelligence should not be happening: • The Canadians gave intelligence information (later proved to be inaccurate and grossly over-stated) to the US authorities, without safeguarding the conditions of its use through so-called caveats; • The US authorities handed Mr Arar over to the Syrians though they had good reason to believe that the person concerned might face torture; • Until now, the US government has refused Mr Arar any means of redress.195 On the positive side, however, there are also important lessons. The Canadian authorities established a Commission of Inquiry which examined the circumstances of the case, cleared Mr Arar’s good name, apologised to him, and awarded him financial compensation.196 The Commission also made recommendations aimed at avoiding future such errors, including the importance of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) keeping distinct their separate policing and intelligence functions. Unfortunately, the Panel’s inquiry has revealed few other examples of this kind of comprehensive inquiry into alleged human rights violations associated with intelligence cooperation, though Canada has taken such action more than once. During the Hearing, the Panel learnt that in December 2006 the authorities had launched another commission of inquiry to inquire into the role of Canadian officials in the detention and maltreatment in Syria of three other dual citizens. The official report concluded that it is reasonable to infer that action by the Canadian RCMP had resulted indirectly in maltreatment amounting to torture of Mr Almalki by Syrian officials. It also found in respect of the other two individuals that actions of Canadian officials, including the sharing of information by the CSIS and/or RCMP with foreign intelligence services, have indirectly resulted in their detention and/or mistreatment amounting to torture in Egypt and/or Syria.197 Cooperative endeavours that directly or indirectly result in serious human rights violations inevitably raise the question of complicity. In situations where exchanges of information are ad hoc, or sporadic, the question of complicity may pose itself to a lesser extent. However, routine, regular and systematic exchanges of information, of the kind that the Panel was told are common between intelligence agencies, raise 195 While not accepting the claim of “state secrets privilege” as such, a US district court in February 2006 dismissed the case on the grounds that allowing it to proceed would harm national security and foreign relations. The dismissal was upheld by the Court of Appeals on similar grounds in June 2008. On 14 August 2008, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a rare order that the Arar case would be heard en banc by all of the active judges on the Second Circuit. The case was heard on 9 December 2008 and is pending judgment. See for further details http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/arar-v.-ashcroft. 196 Office of the Prime Minister, “Letter of apology to Maher Arar and his family by the Prime Minister of Canada Stephen Harper”, 26 January 2007. 197 Public Report of the Internal Inquiry into the actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdulla, Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin by the Honorouable Frank Iacobucci, Q.C., 21 October 2008. pp. 35-39.