Assessing Damage, Urging Action are unsigned and do not reveal their sources. These reports, although usually shared with the defence, cannot by their nature be independently verified. The Panel was told that a combination of the lack of precision inherent in the legal concept of “a threat to public order or national security”, and the comparatively low standards of proof in the administrative system of justice, mean that judges often appeared willing to accord the benefit of the doubt to the intelligence report.216 A 2003 amendment to immigration law in France217 broadened the grounds for administrative expulsion to include incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence against a certain individual or group. It was argued that this permits the French Government to rely on administrative expulsion, rather than criminal prosecution, as a means of dealing with non-citizens accused of extremism and/or fomenting radicalisation. In some testimonies, the Panel was told that allegations of incitement have been wrongly pursued when the “incitement” alleged was nothing more than speech whose protection is guaranteed under the right to freedom of expression.218 Concern was expressed that expulsions of Muslims feed the fear and feeling of exclusion and stigmatisation among members of the Muslim community in France, even perhaps encouraging further radicalisation. The Panel also heard that the Dutch authorities have used national security removals as a substitute for criminal prosecution in some cases. For example, the authorities have declared aliens undesirable, or deported them, when evidence was lacking, or where criminal proceedings have failed to secure a conviction.219 Witnesses before the Panel spoke of the significantly lower standard of procedural guarantees in expulsion proceedings on national security grounds, and some reported that exclusion orders are based upon secret reports of the intelligence service, to which the individual has no or very limited access, and over which the administrative judge has only limited scrutiny.220 Weak domestic standards in this area are complemented by regional safeguards, though these are not always respected.221 216 Written submission by Human Rights Watch, EJP European Union Hearing and its Annex 1 (Human Rights Watch report, In the Name of Prevention, Insufficient Safeguards in National Security Removals, June 2007). 217 Law No. 2003-1119 of 26 November 2003 concerning immigration control, the stay of foreigners in France, and nationality (Official Journal No. 274, November 27, 2003, p. 20136) and Article L 521-3 Code on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners and the Right to Asylum (CESEDA). The amendment also broadened the grounds for deportation following conviction. 218 See written submission by Human Rights Watch, EJP European Union Hearing and its Annex 1. 219 Written submission of the Nederlands Juristen Comite voor de Mensenrechten (NJCM), EJP European Union Hearing, para. 5.2, p. 16, referring to judgments of the Highest Administrative Court in ABRvS 10 July 2006, JV 2006/348; ABRvS 18 September 2006, JV 2006/407. 220 Written submission of the NJCM; testimony of Lara Talsma and Saloua Ouchan, NJCM, EJP European Union Hearing. 221 See written submission of the NJCM, op. cit., with reference to the inapplicability of Article 6 ECHR, limited procedural protection under Article 13 ECHR, and Article 1 Protocol 7 ECHR. 95