Assessing Damage, Urging Action matic assurances irrelevant, so that any deportation of the kind envisaged to Tunisia violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Other human rights oversight bodies have been more critical still of the concept of diplomatic assurances. The former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,250 the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Special Rapporteur on Torture),251 the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Terrorism252 and other universal and regional human rights bodies,253 as well as leading human rights non-governmental organisations, have all rejected the use of diplomatic assurances, not least because the proposed monitoring schemes have been shown to be flawed. The Panel concurs with the view that – in principle and in practice – there are serious problems with the concept of diplomatic assurances. In principle, reliance on diplomatic assurances is wrongly being used as a way of “delegating” responsibility for the absolute prohibition on torture to the receiving country alone. That undermines the truly international nature of the duty to prevent and prohibit torture. In practice, the Panel heard extensive evidence of problems that have arisen: these are, after all, non-binding agreements typically sought from States that already ignore their legally binding obligation to prevent and prohibit torture. Diplomatic assurances are, moreover, exchanged in situations where neither the sending nor receiving State have any self-interest in monitoring compliance. Even if there was a genuine interest in monitoring compliance, it is difficult to envisage how such a system could operate effectively. Unlike the death penalty, which is relatively easy to monitor, it is difficult to guarantee that torture has not occurred in a particular case, since an individual is unlikely to reveal any ill-treatment if he/she remains in the hands of their torturers. Moreover, in many instances, the risk of torture is highly localised, and reassurances from high level government officials based in the capital city cannot always be relied upon. Most importantly of all, even if it becomes known that a diplomatic assurance has been breached, the affected individual has little or no remedy for the harm done (they indeed have limited opportunity in advance to challenge the reliability of any assurances). The Hearings in the Middle East, the Maghreb and Pakistan all illustrated the very real risk of torture, incommunicado detention and manifestly unfair trials (especially in cases involving national security) in those countries from which assurances are typically sought. Elsewhere, for example, in Canada, the Panel was told of diplomatic 250 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/94, 16 February 2006, para. 10 et seq. and 34. 251 See for example Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, and other cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, UN Doc. A/60/316, 15 August 2005, para. 51. 252 Press Release by UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Terrorism, preliminary findings following visit to Spain, 14 May 2008. 253 For further references see Legal Commentary to the ICJ Berlin Declaration, Principle 10, p. 101 et seq. 105