36 Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on terrorism, counter-terrorism and human rights itself, which was so seminal to the defeat of the group, was secured as a result of traditional intelligence and law enforcement work.49 In 1998, the special procedures created to try terrorist offences were extended to cover organised crime. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights later found these special procedures to be in violation of the American Convention on Human Rights.50 In 2003, Peru’s Constitutional Court found the use of “faceless” military courts unconstitutional.51 As a result, more than 700 persons, who had been tried under the 1992 Decree Law, had their sentences annulled and were retried by civilian courts. No one disputes that the success in reducing the threat of Sendero Luminoso came at a tremendously high human and institutional price. Fujimori’s measures distorted the rule of law and damaged the integrity of democratic institutions, including the judiciary. The legacy of this period is a society that is still deeply divided. The lesson from Peru, and Southern Cone countries, is that a reliance on military or special courts to deal with terrorism can pose more problems than it seeks to resolve. 4. Special counter-terrorism laws Past experience suggests that governments often respond speedily to acts of terrorism (or the threat of such acts) with special counter-terrorism legislation. It is not always clear what prompts this response, whether an attempt to pre-empt or respond to public concerns, or possibly to further a government’s distinct political ends. In the current phase of terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts, governments (especially in liberal democratic countries) may feel under pressure to act and be seen to act speedily in the face of any such threat. The risk is that such legislation is drafted quickly, without consideration of other non-legislative measures, and at such speed that inadequate scrutiny occurs and problems subsequently arise. 49 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, Random House, 2006; David Scott Palmer, “Terror in the Name of Mao”, in Robert J Art and Louise Richardson (eds.), Democracy and counter-terrorism; Lessons from the Past, US Institute for Peace, Washington D.C., 2007, pp. 86, 104. 50 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgments of 17 September 1997 and 8 March 1998, Case No. 33 and 47, Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru; Judgment of 18 August 2000, Case No. 69, Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru; Judgment of 30 May 1999, Case No. 52, Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru; Judgments of 6 February 2001 and 4 September 2001, Cases No. 74 and 84, Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru; Judgment of 8 July 2004, Case No. 110, Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru; Judgment of 18 November 2004, Case No. 115, De la Cruz-Flores v. Peru; Judgments of 25 November 2006 and 2 August 2008, Case No. 160 and 181, The Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru; Judgment of 6 April 2006, Case No. 147, Baldeón-Garcia v. Peru; Judgment of 22 November 2005, Case No. 136, Gómez–Palomino; Judgment of 29 November 2006, Case No. 162, La Cantuta v. Peru. 51 In Marcelino Tineo Silva y más de 5,000 ciudadanos, TC [No. 8231] D.O. 236530, Judgment of 3 January 2003, the Constitutional Court of Peru recognised its jurisdiction over challenges to the constitutionality of Peruvian laws and decrees. It reviewed several provisions of the 1992 anti-terrorism laws decreed by President Fujimori and the Peruvian Congress in light of the 1993 Constitution. The Court declared sections of the laws unconstitutional or in violation of the American Convention on Human Rights, including the principle of legality.