Assessing Damage, Urging Action
the legislation would inevitably lead to serious human rights violations, noting at
the time of the enactment of the PTA:
“A power to detain suspects for long periods, without the opportunity for access
by friends, family, or lawyers, or for regular judicial review, notoriously carries
the danger that the detainees will be maltreated while in custody: it provides an
open invitation for deprivation, assault, and worse – especially if the suspects
may be detained by their interrogators in police stations or army camps – and
more especially still, if no real control is exercised over the periods for which
that they are detained.” 56
If it is widely known, and predicted in advance, that a reduction in basic safeguards
will lead to serious human rights violations, the question arises as to the real intention of the authors of special counter-terrorist legislation. Does counter-terrorism
legislation really aim at upholding security and reducing levels of violence, or rather
at giving a license to the security forces to respond as they think fit? A prominent
human rights scholar suggested:
“Sri Lanka’s experience with emergency powers, and the Prevention of Terrorism
Act (PTA) illuminates the complex interaction between violence and repression
by the state, and violence and terror by non-state actors. Many commentators
maintain that the draconian measures taken by Sri Lanka have only enhanced
the cycle of violence, leading to the destruction of the social and political fabric
of a democratic society. The use of unbridled power by state authorities in both
the north and south of the island, has led to many deaths, mounting disillusionment, and violent backlash by aggrieved communities […]. The use of these
powers has also helped develop a culture of repression and impunity among
members of the security establishment. The lack of a reasonable and effective
response to terrorist activity committed by non-state actors has led to more
social unrest and the dominance of military considerations in the resolution of
essentially political dilemmas.” 57
The information presented to the Panel suggests that changes to the normal criminal
justice system have frequently created institutional incentives to torture or ill-treat
prisoners and inflict other serious human rights violations. There is also the risk that
counter-terrorist measures are built up over time, and it is the cumulative impact
56
Paul Sieghart, Sri Lanka, A Mounting Tragedy of Errors, Report of a Mission to Sri Lanka in January 1984 on
behalf of the International Commission of Jurists and its British Section, JUSTICE, International Commission
of Jurists, London, 1984, p. 37-38.
57
Radhika Coomaraswamy and Charmaine de los Reyes, “Rule by Emergency: Sri Lanka’s Post Colonial
Constitutional Experience”, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol.2, No. 2, April 2004, p. 272.
39
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