Assessing Damage, Urging Action Panel is concerned that the reasons for non-disclosure have become less clear, and go beyond the valid requirements of secrecy attached to intelligence work. Another cause for concern is the weaker or non-existent role that lawyers are accorded when intelligence agencies carry out law enforcement powers. Due process relies to a large extent on good legal counsel. Lawyers who met with the Panel contended that intelligence agencies tend to be more hostile to their participation in interviews than do law enforcement agencies. The latter are regularly exposed to legal scrutiny, and collect information in the clear knowledge that it may subsequently be legally challenged; intelligence agents have little or no such experience. 3. Intelligence cooperation The transnational character of the contemporary terrorist threat means that intelligence agencies increasingly cooperate with their foreign counterparts. National security officials told the Panel that they are often dependent on information from foreign intelligence services, since many terrorist networks or cells posing a threat are based in other countries. This cooperation often involves working with States that have insufficient domestic human rights safeguards, or, worse still, with intelligence agencies with a long history of systematic involvement in human rights violations. The Panel believes that such cooperation is necessary. However, if States are to avoid the charge of complicity, and avoid their agents being pursued in subsequent legal actions, a clear legal framework for intelligence cooperation, and safeguards to ensure compliance with human rights law, are essential. It is true that effective oversight of the domestic activities of intelligence agencies is sometimes difficult to ensure; establishing effective oversight of activities carried out in cooperation with other intelligence agencies may prove even more so.185 The Panel was, nevertheless, left in no doubt as to the need for a clear regulatory framework, and the need for international safeguards to complement domestic measures. 3.1 Rendition and Extraordinary Rendition In human rights terms, one of the most worrying developments arising from increased intelligence cooperation is the practice of rendition and extraordinary rendition. withheld from the accused even in criminal proceedings under the condition that there are counter-balancing measures, such as questioning through the judge. 185 Yet the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe has indicated that there is no shortage of ideas as to how to ensure the accountability of intelligence services: the challenge is more one of putting the ideas into practice, see Council of Europe, Venice Commission, Report on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services, 11 June 2007, CDL-AD(2007)016, paras. 261-262. For further guidance on ways to ensure effective accountability over intelligence services, see Hans Born and Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies, 2005, Chapter 12. 79