CAT/OP/POL/RONPM/1 required action if needed. For instance, a police officer reported that each case of coercion by police officers was recorded in a note or in a special report; however, such documents were never requested by the mechanism. Furthermore, even though it was reported that there were seven adults and one juvenile in the facility in the morning, no attempts were made to clarify their location with a view to talking to them. During the tour of premises many important things were not checked, including the list of available free legal assistance, lawyers’ rooms and toilets for detainees. No questions were asked about the interpretation arrangements in place, despite the fact that, during the visit, there were some foreigners in the police station who did not speak Polish. 39. The Subcommittee recommends that the mechanism be more operational during the detention visits in general, and that it split into smaller groups in order to be able to monitor different areas and talk to as many detainees as possible. All the visits require strategic planning and need to be planned step by step. All members of the team should be fully aware of their respective roles and be able to proceed swiftly. In order to carry out more activities that involve actual monitoring, the rules and regulations of the place of deprivation of liberty should be studied carefully before each visit. 40. During the joint visits, the Subcommittee delegation observed that the members of the mechanism did not always introduce themselves as being from the mechanism. As a result, they were often perceived to be representatives of the office of the ombudsperson, because the latter was a more widely recognized and better-known institution. This could lead to confusion about the separate mandates of each institution, both among the detention authorities and the detainees. Furthermore, the Subcommittee delegation noted that the members of the mechanism were not clearly identified as such, and did not explicitly explain their mandate more concretely, including by making a clear distinction between the activities and obligations of the mechanism and those of the office of the ombudsperson. 41. The Subcommittee recommends that all members of the national preventive mechanism, including external experts, introduce themselves as representatives of the mechanism. The Subcommittee is of the view that an appropriate and complete presentation builds trust with the interviewees and facilitates communication and information-sharing. In addition, the visiting team should be clearly identified as the mechanism, for example, by wearing badges or vests, and should provide an information leaflet to the authorities as well as to the detainees. 2. Confidentiality and risk of reprisals 42. The Subcommittee noted that some exchanges of information with detainees were conducted in the presence or in hearing distance of detention officers. In this connection, the Subcommittee reiterates that the location where the individual interviews are conducted should be carefully chosen in order to ensure that the content of the interview remains confidential and that the “do no harm” principle is applied, without exception. The interviewers should also indicate that the interviewees can report to them any reprisals that occur subsequent to the visit of the mechanism and encourage them to do so. If necessary, follow-up visits should be conducted. The Subcommittee underlines the need to always seek ways to protect those interviewed from possible reprisals, even when there appears to be little risk. During the visit carried out jointly with the mechanism, the Subcommittee noted that at the final debriefings, the staff of the mechanism had failed to mention to the authorities at the place of detention that any form of intimidation or reprisal against persons deprived of their liberty constituted a violation of the State party’s obligations, in accordance with article 13 of the Convention and article 21 of the Optional Protocol. 43. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism always consider that there is a risk of intimidation, sanctions or reprisals, and therefore take steps to address that risk. In addition to the precautions mentioned above, the mechanism should clearly inform the authorities that a reprisal of any kind is impermissible and will be reported to the respective authorities and followed up by the mechanism. This is done with the clear intention of ensuring that those responsible for such reprisals are promptly investigated and, if found guilty, receive appropriate penalties. The mechanism should also, inter alia, develop a strategy on the prevention of reprisals and undertake preventive follow-up visits thereto. 8