CRPD/C/24/D/36/2016 It also notes the State party’s information that an application to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for review of a decision made under the Mental Health Act 2014 under Victorian legislation does not entail any legal fees. The Committee further notes the author’s submission that he challenged his treatment order before the Mental Health Tribunal, and by submitting a habeas corpus complaint to the Supreme Court of Victoria on 22 March 2016 and a subsequent request for injunctive relief on 26 April 2016. It notes his claims that any additional attempt to exhaust domestic remedies would be unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief. 7.5 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that, although there is no obligation to exhaust domestic remedies if they have no reasonable prospect of being successful, authors of communications must exercise due diligence in the pursuit of available remedies, and that mere doubts or assumptions about the effectiveness of domestic remedies do not absolve authors from exhausting them.2 In the present case, the Committee notes that it is undisputed between the parties that the author did not appeal any decision of the Mental Health Tribunal to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and that he did not submit a complaint before the Mental Health Complaints Commissioner. The Committee also notes the State party’s information that the author could have challenged any potential decision of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal before the Supreme Court of Victoria. The Committee takes note of the author’s argument that any additional attempt made by him to exhaust domestic remedies would have been unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief. It notes, however, that the author has not provided any further information, documentation or argumentation as to why he considers that the exhaustion of domestic remedies in this regard would have been unreasonably prolonged or ineffective. Therefore, the Committee considers that the author has failed to exhaust available domestic remedies, and finds that the communication is inadmissible pursuant to article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol. 7.6 Having thus concluded, the Committee will not separately examine the admissibility grounds under article 2 (e) of the Optional Protocol. C. Conclusion 8. The Committee therefore decides: (a) Protocol; That the communication is inadmissible under article 2 (d) of the Optional (b) That the present decision shall be communicated to the State party and to the author. 2 6 D.L. v. Sweden (CRPD/C/17/D/31/2015), para. 7.3; E.O.J. et al. v. Sweden (CRPD/C/18/D/28/2015), para. 10.6; and T.M. v. Greece (CRPD/C/21/D/42/2017), para. 6.4. See also V.S. v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/115/D/2072/2011), para. 6.3; García Perea v. Spain (CCPR/C/95/D/1511/2006), para. 6.2; and Vargay v. Canada (CCPR/C/96/D/1639/2007), para. 7.3.