The Disappearing Trial 21. Some who accept plea deals which result in a noncustodial sentence do not fully understand that doing so leaves them with a conviction,15 which will often have long-term impacts on their ability to find employment, receive benefits and services, or sustain legal immigration status, and which may result in longer sentences in the case of later convictions. Lack of adequate legal representation inevitably means the defendant has a lack of information (about both their rights and the implications of accepting the plea deal) which would be necessary to ensure that any waivers are voluntary and intelligent. 22. In many cases, defendants are routinely required to agree to excessive waivers. For example, in many US jurisdictions, it is a common practice for prosecutors to require waivers not only of the right to trial, but the right to appeal, even on the grounds of ineffective legal assistance.16 A case currently before the Supreme Court of the United States queries whether acceptance of a plea deal signifies an inherent waiver of the right to challenge the constitutionality of the underlying criminal statute.17 These waivers compound the lack of judicial scrutiny to which cases involving plea deals are subject. 23.  There is also substantial variation in the scope of evidence the prosecution discloses prior to negotiating a plea deal, meaning that by waiving the right to trial, defendants are also waiving the right to confront the evidence against them, and indeed to appreciate the likelihood of conviction at trial. The normal rules of disclosure are linked to trial, and there is no established baseline of evidence that must be disclosed prior to a plea deal being concluded. Often, plea deals offered by prosecutors are made contingent upon the defendant accepting them within a short time frame (for example, so-called “explosive” plea offers that expire within 24 hours, with the benefits offered diminishing thereafter),18 limiting the time available for full disclosure by the prosecution or investigation by the defence. B. Discrimination: juveniles, people with disabilities, and racial and ethnic minorities 24. The US permits the use of plea bargaining (as opposed to diversion) in cases involving juvenile defendants. The Supreme Court of the United States has accepted,19 and research has demonstrated,20 the cognitive limits of juvenile defendants which seriously inhibit their decision-making skills in the face of interrogation and prosecution. Research has further demonstrated that juveniles are routinely unable to understand fully the consequences of a plea deal, not only in terms of the punishment they receive but also in relation to their waiver of rights.21 The problem becomes compounded when a juvenile is transferred from specialised juvenile or family courts to adult criminal court (as is possible in some jurisdictions, often according to the age of the defendant and the type of offence alleged), where the stakes are higher, and a plea deal can become more tempting.22 The transfer of juveniles to adult court significantly shifts the balance of power to the prosecutor because of the increased chance of a juvenile accepting a plea deal.23 15. Olson, T. M., “Strike One, Ready for More?: The Consequences of Plea Bargaining ‘First Strike’ Offenders under California’s ‘Three Strikes’ Law”, California Western law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2000), pp. 545-570. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1230&context=cwlr. 16. The practice of requiring waivers of certain constitutional and statutory rights has been limited somewhat in the federal jurisdiction both by case law and by US Department of Justice policy. See guidance here: https://www.justice.gov/USm/criminal-resource-manual-626-plea-agreements-and-sentencing-appeal-waiversdiscussion-law. However, the practice remains in some states and localities. 17. Class v. US, 16–424. Available at: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/class-v-united-states/. 18. See, e.g., Zottoli, T. M., Daftary-Kapur, T., Winters, G. M. and Hogan, C., “Plea discounts, time pressures, and false-guilty pleas in youth and adults who pleaded guilty to felonies in New York City”, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, Vol. 22(3) (Aug. 2016), pp. 250–259. 19. Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005) (prohibiting the use of the death penalty against juvenile defendants), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 US (2012) (prohibiting the use of mandatory life without parole for juveniles), oral arguments and written judgments available at: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-9646. 20. Steinberg, L. and Scott, E. S., “Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty”, Am. Psychologist, Vol. 58(12) (Dec. 2003), pp. 1009–1018. 21. Shteynberg, R. V. and Redlich, A. D., “To Plead or Not to Plead: A Comparison of Juvenile and Adult True and False Plea Decisions”, Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 40, No. 6 (Dec. 2016), pp. 611–625 (finding that juvenile defendants are more likely to plead guilty when they are assumed innocent and less likely to consider the consequences of the decision to plead guilty). 22. Dougherty, J., “Negotiating Justice in the Juvenile System: A Comparison of Adult Plea Bargaining and Juvenile Intake”, Fed. Probation, Vol. 52(2) (Jun. 1988), pp. 72–80. See also Letourneau, E. J. et al., “Sex Offender Registration and Notification Policy Increases Juvenile Plea Bargains”, Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr. 2013), pp. 189–207. Available at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1079063212455667. 23. Zimring, F. E., “The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer: A Mildly Revisionist History of the 1990s”, Louisiana Law. Rev., Vol. 71(1) (2010). 11.