CCPR/C/128/D/2381/2014 Committee recalls that standing under the Optional Protocol may be determined independently of national regulations and legislation governing an individual’s standing before a domestic court of law,2 and that a non-custodial parent has sufficient standing to represent his or her children before the Committee. 3 In the present case, the Committee observes that, given their age, the children are not capable of expressing their own views about submitting a communication, or of consenting to their representation by any person. Furthermore, the case file does not show that the submission of the communication by their mother is clearly against their best interest. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the bond between the author and her children and the nature of the claims are sufficient to justify representation of the children before the Committee by their mother. The Committee therefore concludes that there is no obstacle to the admissibility of the communication under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 8.3 The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the author did not exhaust domestic remedies as it cannot be concluded from the author’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court that her application concerned all aspects relating to the custody of the children and the author’s visitation rights. It also takes note of the State party’s argument that at the time that the State party’s additional observations were submitted to the Committee, the author’s appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court against the Administrative Court’s ruling of 12 September 2014, concerning the restriction of contact between the author and her children, was still pending. The Committee notes the author’s allegations that her application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court concerned the whole decision of the Court of Appeal, that the Administrative Court’s decision of 12 September 2014 concerning the placement of the children cannot be further appealed and that domestic remedies have proved to be ineffective. 8.4 With regard to the requirement laid down in article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee refers to its jurisprudence and recalls that the determination whether or not all remedies have been exhausted is made at the time a communication is being examined.4 In the present case, the Committee observes that the author has applied to the courts regarding the custody and place of residence of her children on a number of occasions. Specifically, she has appealed the District Court’s ruling that granted sole custody of the children to the father and disposed their residence in the father’s house. On 12 September 2014, her application for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court. On the same day, her appeals against the decisions of the Social Services of 10 April 2014 concerning the placement of the children were dismissed by the Administrative Court. The Committee considers that the State party has failed to indicate which other remedies, in addition to those tried by the author, could have been effective to deal with her claims regarding the custody and place of residence of her children. Given the nature of the issues under consideration, the Committee is of the view that the author has made sufficient efforts to bring her claims before the national authorities, and concludes that it is not precluded from considering these aspects of the communication pursuant to article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. At the same time, the Committee considers itself presently barred by reasons of lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies from considering questions of visitation rights, since these issues are still pending on appeal before the Supreme Administrative Tribunal. 8.5 As regards the alleged violations of article 5 of the Covenant, the Committee observes that article 5 relates to general undertakings by States parties and cannot be invoked by individuals as a self-standing ground for a communication under the Optional Protocol.5 This claim is thus inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 2 3 4 5 8 Human Rights Committee, P.S. v. Denmark, communication No. 397/1990, para 5.2. N.T. v. Canada (CCPR/C/89/D/1052/2002/Rev.1), para 7.4. Al-Gertani v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (CCPR/C/109/D/1955/2010), para. 9.3; Singh v. France (CCPR/C/102/D/1876/2009), para. 7.3; Lemercier v. France (CCPR/C/86/D/1228/2003), para. 6.4; Baroy v. Philippines (CCPR/C/79/D/1045/2002), para. 8.3; and Bakhtiyari and Bakhtiyari v. Australia (CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002), para. 8.2. M. v. Belgium (CCPR/C/113/DR/2176/2012), para 6.5; and Wackenheim v. France (CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999), para. 6.5.