CAT/C/SLE/CO/1 Administration of justice 18. The Committee is concerned at the small number of judges and prosecutors in the State party, which generates serious delays in trials and limits access to justice to victims of torture or ill-treatment. The Committee is also highly disturbed by the manner in which the detention system of the State party has allegedly become vulnerable to corrupt practices in that bail is usually granted upon payment of “speed money” to the police and the judiciary, particularly in the local courts. The Committee also notes the absence of safeguards for the protection of the independence of the judiciary, all of which may hamper the effective administration of justice as a means of combating torture (art. 2) The State party should: (a) Pursue the reform of the judicial system that it has initiated and take appropriate measures to increase the number and quality of the available judicial and prosecutorial capacity; (b) Reinforce the measures in place for countering police and judicial misconduct, particularly corrupt practices in all their forms, which may hinder the progress of investigations and the proper functioning of an independent, impartial and appropriate legal and judicial system; (c) Carry out investigations, bring perpetrators to justice and, in the case of convictions, impose adequate penalties; (d) Guarantee and protect the independence of the judiciary, ensure their security of tenure, improve the legislation governing their conduct, and provide judges with continuous professional development training, including in judicial conduct and the Convention, in line with the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (see General Assembly resolutions 40/32 and 40/146). Superior orders and command responsibility 19. While taking note of the statement in the State report that the rules governing public officials do not preclude officers from liability for torture if they invoke superior orders as a defence (CAT/C/SLE/1, para. 41), the Committee remains concerned at the lack of clarity regarding the existence of mechanisms that offer subordinates who refuse to obey such an order protection against retaliation by superior officers. The Committee is also concerned at the lack of information on whether or not the principle of command or superior responsibility for acts of torture committed by subordinates is recognized in domestic laws (arts. 1 and 2). In the light of the Committee’s general comment No. 2, the State party should establish, both in law and in practice: (a) The right of all law enforcement officials to refuse, as subordinates, to execute an order from their superior officers that would result in contravention of the Convention; (b) Mechanisms to protect subordinates from reprisals if they refuse to carry out an order from a superior that is in breach of the Convention; (c) The criminal responsibility of those exercising superior authority for acts of torture or ill-treatment committed by subordinates where they knew or should have known that such impermissible conduct was, or was likely, to occur, yet took no reasonable and necessary preventive measures. 7